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FEASIBILITY IN CHAPTER X REORGANIZATIONS
DAVID R. KINGI
I. INTRODUCTION
IN REVISING THE BANKRUPTCY ACT' in 1938, Congress
amended the provisions dealing with corporate reorganizations,
replacing section 77B with Chapter X.' Chapter X provides that a
court may approve or confirm a plan of reorganization only after de-
termining that the plan is "fair and equitable, and feasible." 8 To
arrive at this conclusion, a federal court must necessarily inquire into
two major areas: the feasibility or practicability of the new corporate
financial structure, and the fairness with which creditors and Cquity
holders of the debtor are allocated participation in the reorganized
enterprise. This article will focus upon the first inquiry, the nature
of feasibility, exploring the factors that are, and those that should
be, considered in determining whether the new corporate structure
is feasible. There is a great need for this analysis since in the past,
this area has been given sporadic and incomplete treatment, with
little or no attempt to formulate an overall policy as to the require-
ments of feasibility under Chapter X.'
t Member of the Pennsylvania Bar. A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1971;
J.D., Harvard University, 1974.
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. (1970).
2. Chandler Act §§ 1 et seq., 11 U.S.C. §§ 501 et seq. (1970), formerly ch. 424,
§ 1, 48 Stat. 912 (1934).
3. 11 U.S.C. §§ 574, 621(2) (1970). The fact that a plan fulfills the require-
ments of § 216, 11 U.S.C. § 616 (1970) (listing the elements of a plan of reorganiza-
tion), does not necessarily demonstrate that the plan is fair, equitable, and feasible.
In re Lorraine Castel Apts. Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'g 53
F. Supp. 994 (N.D. 11. 1944), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728 (1945) ; In re Janson Steel
& Iron Co., 47 F. Supp. 652, 656 (E.D. Pa. 1942); In re Warren Bros., 43 F. Supp.
173, 175 (D. Mass. 1942).
4. The subject of feasibility has received minor treatment in a popular treatise:
6A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 11.07 (14th ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
Feasibility, has also been discussed in several casebooks: W. BLUM, MATERIALS ON
INSOLVENCY AND REORGANIZATION (rev. ed. 1960); W. BLUM & S. KAPLAN,
MATERIALS ON REORGANIZATION, RECAPITALIZATION AND INSOLVENCY (1969); V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE (1972)
[hereinafter cited as BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN], and has been explored in several
older law review articles: Blum, The Law and Language of Corporate Reorganiza-
tion, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 565 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Blum, The Law]; Calkins,
Feasibility in Plans of Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter X, 61 HARV. L. REV.
763 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Calkins, Feasibility]; Note, Feasibility in Corporate
Reorganization, 4 STAN. L. REV. 125 (1951).
Recently, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States
[hereinafter cited as Bankruptcy Commission] has recommended a complete revision
of the bankruptcy and reorganization process. The Bankruptcy Commission was
created by the Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468. It filed the
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
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Chapter X's requirement of feasibility is derived from former
section 77B(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act,5 and focuses upon the
overall economic soundness of the plan. 6 Although the concept of
feasibility has been described in various ways, Judge Kirkpatrick
aptly summarized the requirement as follows:
A plan is feasible if it does not provide for an excessive capital
structure, if it gives the new company a reasonable prospect for
survival, and if the net earnings which the new company may
reasonably anticipate over the indefinite future will be sufficient
to meet the interest and dividend requirements of the new securi-
ties to be issued.7
The Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC) has
developed its own interpretation, stressing that feasibility acts to en-
sure "the emergence of the debtor from reorganization in a solvent
condition and with reasonable prospects of financial stability and
success." s In essence, feasibility is required for the purpose of avoid-
ing the cost and embarrassment that would result if the reorganized
enterprise were to encounter financial distress again!)
To insure against such an occurrence, reorganization plans must
be workable; the synonym "feasible" is an appropriate label for this
concept because it combines more euphoniously with "fair," and
[hereinafter cited as BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT], H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), in two parts upon July 31 and August 6, 1973, and then
ceased to exist. The Bankruptcy Commission's proposals have been introduced in the
Senate and House as the "Bankruptcy Act of 1973," S. 2565, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Proposed
Act]. The Proposed Act, although suggesting major changes in the bankruptcy and
reorganization laws, retains the feasibility requirement of Chapter X. Proposed Act
§ 7-310(d) (2) (A) ; II BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, at 254 n.8 (1973).
5. Former § 77B(f) (1) provided:
After hearing such objections as may be made to the plan, the judge shall confirm
the plan if satisfied that (1) it is fair and equitable and does not discriminate
unfairly in favor of any class of creditors and stockholders, and is feasible.
Bankruptcy Act § 77(B)(f)(1), ch. 424, § 77B(f)(1), 48 Stat. 919 (1934), os
amended, 11 U.S.C. § 621 (1970). See S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35
(1938).
6. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 36 (1938). SEC, REPORT OF THE
STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS
OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. VIII, at 159 (1940) [herein-
after cited as PROTECTIVE COMM. REPORT].
7. In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 129, 130 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
8. Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 194 (1945).
9. 10 SEC ANN. REP. 151 (1944). The Commission stated:
The extent to which [1944] reorganizations are attrilutable to lack of feasibility
in previous reorganizations is indicated by the fact that numerous Chapter X
proceedings involved companies which had already undergone reorganization in
equity receivership proceedings or under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. In
order to avoid a similar record as to Chapter X cases some years hence, with its
attendant expense and injury to investors, the Commission urges that adequate
consideration be given to feasibility.
2
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sounds less pedestrian.' °  The intent is clear: any corporation in
need of reorganization probably represents a high degree of risk."
Therefore, the standard of feasibility requires that the court minimize
this risk for the reorganized debtor. 2 While it is not necessary that
success be guaranteed - a requirement which would be impossible
to fulfill - the court must be assured that -there is reasonable poten-
tial for success.
It is important to keep in mind that feasibility represents but one
part of the entire reorganization process. Professor Thurman Arnold
described the process of corporate reorganization as follows:
The ritual of corporate reorganization . . . is perhaps the most
interesting of all our legal rituals from a ceremonial point of
view, because it is the most complicated mystery of all. . . . [It]
is a combination of a municipal election, a historical pageant, an
antivice crusade, a graduate-school seminar, a judicial proceed-
ing, and a series of horse trades, all rolled into one - thoroughly
buttered with learning and frosted with distinguished names.
Here the union of law and economics is celebrated by one of the
wildest ideological orgies in intellectual history. Men work all
night preparing endless documents in answer to other endless
10. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 570.
11. Risk here is defined in terms of the risk of a subsequent bankruptcy both to
investors in the particular reorganized debtor, and to the economy as a whole. The
emphasis upon insuring against the debtor's return to the reorganization courts is
evident in both SEC and judicial reports. Note, however, that with respect to public
utilities, the risk could be defined as the likelihood of interruption of the extant
dividend policy. As the experience with regard to Consolidated Edison has recently
shown, this is often tantamount to bankruptcy, due to a utility's high capital demands
and classic rejection of retained earnings as the major financing source. This par-
ticular aspect of risk has not been adequately articulated by the SEC. Aside from
the risk associated with a failure to meet fixed charges (and forced reorganization),
there arises the thorny issue of whether the inherent risk attached to the particular
collection of capital goods operating in the particular industry is increased or de-
creased by the added administrative costs and possible reduction of both sales and
earnings associated with the reorganization process. A simple way to pose this prob-
lem is to hypothesize two identical companies - one entirely financed by equity, the
other by debt - and to determine whether the latter corporation will be any riskier
than the former if it must subsequently go through reorganization and emerge with
all equity capital structure. See Baxter,: Leverage,, Risk of Ruin and the Cost of
Capital, 22 J. FIN. 395 (1967); Robicheh & Myers, Problems in the Theory of.
Optimal Capital Structure, 1 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL. 1 (1966).
12. See Gerdes, General Principles of Plans of Corporate Reorganization, 89 U.
PA. L. REv. 39 (1940), where the author stated:
The first objective of a reorganization should be the production of a sound
economic unit - a corporation able to operate its business successfully and pay
a reasonable return to those having interests in it. Unless this is accomplished,
losses will continue, liquidation or another reorganization at a subsequent date
will be necessary, and all losses sustained in the intervening period will diminish
the amounts which could have been distributed to creditors and stockholders if
liquidation or an effective reorganization had occurred in the first place. The
statutes recognized this objective by requiring that the court must find that the
plan is "feasible."
Id. at 41-42.
[VOL. 20: p. 302
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documents, which other men read in order to make solemn argu-
ments. At the same time practical politicians utilize every re-
source of patronage, demagoguery, arid coercion beneath the
solemn smoke screen.
Although to the casual observer the complications seem
most -forbidding, actually the dialectic of this process is very
simple. It consists in the endless repetition in different forms
of -the notion that men must pay their debts, in a situation in
which neither men nor debts in any real sense are involved.'"
By way of organization, this article initially attempts to analyze
the concept of feasibility.' 4 Next, it offers an examination of the
various economic and financial concepts which must be considered in
evaluating a debtor's capital structure. There is then an attempt to
assimilate the SEC's view of feasibility, with the ultimate goal of pro-
viding concrete guidelines as to particular elements of the concept. Fin-
ally, the paper concludes with a framework for a contemporary theory of
feasibility.
13. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 230-31 (1937).
14. This article will not discuss the feasibility standard in railroad reorganiza-
tions pursuant to section 77, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970). The feasibility standard in that
context involves somewhat different policy considerations. See generally Ecker v.
Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943); Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorgani-
cation Under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1943).
In addition, in section 77 railroad reorganizations, the capital structure of the re-
organized debtor is but one element of the "public interest" which the Interstate
Commerce Commission is charged with protecting. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v.
Fleming, 157 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 780 (1946), quoting
Group of Inst'l Invs. v. Chicago, M. St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 544 (1942); 10
-REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 4225-29 (1947).
.Nor will this article attempt to formulate a detailed quantitative analysis of
the relationship between various feasibility issues and the predicted risk-of-ruin of
a firm. For that, the reader is referred to the following: Altman, Financial Ratios,
Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23 J. FIN. 589
(1968); Baxter, supra note 11; Beaver, Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure,
4 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 71 (1966); Beaver, Market Prices, Financial Ratios, and the
Prediction of Failure, 6 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 179 (1968) ; Bierman & Thomas, Ruin
Considerations and Debt Issuance, 7 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1361 (1972). The
.potential of such studies is great; for if by using discriminant analysis, one can
isolate various "causes" of bankruptcy, then theoretically an inquiry into the feasibility
of any given capital structure can focus upon these variables and produce a company
with less chance of ruin. However, it must be emphasized that this analysis is only
theoretical, as there is a big jump from isolating factors which caused a given set of
companies to fail to the use of this information to keep another "new" enterprise -
albeit one that uses the same capital as its predecessor - from bankruptcy. The
modeling process holds great promise in this area. See E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA (1971), where the authors develop a sophisticated bank-
ruptcy prediction model.
4
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I. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF FEASIBILITY
A. The Liquidation-Reorganization Game
Professor Arnold was accurate in his observation that the cou-
pling of law and economics in a corporate reorganization is "cele-
brated by one of the wildest ideological orgies in intellectual history."' 5
How can a firm possibly claim to have a value as a going concern if
its net income falls short of its fixed charges, and why should this firm
be given protection from the certain death a market regime mandates?
The problem is ensconced in the rather nebulous area where law
and economics intersect. From an economic point of view "failure"
means nothing more than an excess of average costs (in historical
sense) over average receipts.'" That is, while potentially the return
upon investment in this enterprise surpassed the potential return upon
available alternative investments, the realized returns upon the enter-
prise in question have fallen far short of expectation.
Failure in this sense, however, does not necessarily cause the
firm in question to cease operation or default upon any of its fixed
obligations. Many firms are failures in this economic con-text and yet
do not withdraw from the industry. Since the economic definition of
failure does not take into account -the existence or discontinuance of
the entity,'7 there remains much potential for Thurman Arnold's
ideological orgy. A firm bases its decision to continue operations
upon expected returns and its ability to cover current costs. There-
fore, a company may be a failure for many years and yet due to the
absence of legally enforceable debt, it is never unable to meet its
current obligations, and thus remains in the industry."8
However, the orgy is not concluded, even if financial troubles
should lead to default, and bankruptcy, for the capital goods, as
opposed to the specific enterprise itself, may nonetheless continue to
be used in production for a considerable time interval, thereby affect-
ing the total output and price of the commodity or service concerned.1"
15. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
16. In terms of diagrammatical analysis, average total cost exceeds average
revenue. N. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 332-35 (1940).
See also Buchanan, Economics of Corporate Reorganization, 54 Q.J. OF EcoN. 28,
29 (1939).
17. E. ALTMAN, supra note 14, at 2. See also P. VAN ARSDELL, CORPORATION
FINANCE 1474-77 (1968), attempting to clearly distinguish business, economic, and
legal failure.
18. This issue continually arises. To the extent that an all-equity capital
structure for reorganized enterprises is insisted upon, will there be an inevitable in-
crease in the number of "failures" remaining in business? Or is a further reorgani-
zation merely delayed? Compare this to the well-known revolving door aspect of
railroad reorganizations. Is this "good" for our economy?
19. N. BUCHANAN, THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE ENTERPRISE 335 (1940).
[VOL. 20: p. 302
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The degree to which resources are withdrawn depends upon the de-
gree to which it is possible to liquidate and distribute the capital
goods or to adapt them to the production of alternative goods and
services. Many capital goods are so highly specialized that they are
not adaptable to uses other than those for which they were originally
designed. If the only alternative to continuing the present use oi
these goods is to sell them for scrap, then the production process will
continue if the liquid funds obtained from selling the capital goods
for scrap, when invested elsewhere, will yield a lower return than
that obtainable from using the capital goods as before." A whole
succession of "enterprises," however defined, may come into being
and pass out of existence before these capital goods are in any way
withdrawn from the industry. This fact has important economic
consequences: a comparatively long interval may be required before
needed adjustments to the level of capital employed in 'a particular
industry can be made. Years may pass before this misdirected in-
vestment in capital will cease to ,exert its influence upon the supply
curve. When a corporation attempts a Chapter X reorganization,
all of these issues are unfortunately embodied in the simple query, "Can
this corporation be reorganized, or should it. be liquidated?"
Aside from the economic and legal issues, there is another force -
the institutional inertia which dictates that an enterprise once formed
.shall not die:
Institutions once formed have the persistency of all living
things. They .tend to grow and expand. Even when their utility
both to the public and their own members has disappeared, they
still survive. The economic theory that marginal business con-
cerns will be eliminated by competition has just about as much
truth in it as a theory that marginal churches which do not ac-
tually increase the comfort and happiness of their members tend
to eliminate themselves. Sometimes they do; sometimes they
do not ....
Habit, as well as sentiment, is a powerful factor. In the
anarchy of the soft-coal industry in West Virginia the writer
20. Id. at 334 n.23. The author stated:
This is a matter of common observation familiar to everyone. For instance,
most street railway companies in the United States now earn a negligible return
on the basis of past historical capital investment. Yet the equipment being highly
specialized in the form of tracks, cars, wires, etc., it is'next to impossible to adapt
it to other uses and its scrap value net after disinvestment costs is very small. As
a consequence such enterprises continue to operate so long as they succeed in
securing an income from selling transportation service greater than the direct out-
of-pocket costs involved in producing that service by an amount at least equal to a
fair return on the net scrap value of the equipment. When the returns fall below
that the tracks are torn up and the cars sold for kindling wood and scrap iron. Id.
6
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has seen a coal-mining company go bankrupt only to be taken
over by its creditors, who go bankrupt, only to be taken over
by their creditors, who go bankkrupt, and so on.
The economic law which is supposed to cause marginal busi-
nesses to be eliminated does not work at all when it deals with
organizations whose members prevent each other from express-
ing the doubts which all of them feel. No one likes to change
his former position before his fellows. There is nothing so in-
elastic as a great organization of any kind because of men's pas-
sion for appearing consistent in public.21
A consideration of -the subject of feasibility must necessarily in-
clude all these issues, particularly if feasibility is viewed as incon-
sistent with a high degree of risk that the debtor may be forced
to seek another reorganization. 2 Before any plan can be effectuated,
the court must decide if liquidation is more appropriate than reorgani-
tion. The basic economic issues have been explored above; stated
simply, the sum of the individual values of the various components
of production - capital goods - is often less than their value in
combination.23 Many management representatives would state this
proposition differently. To them, the traditional factors of produc-
tion - labor, raw materials, and capital - make up every economic
unit, and only the presence of a fourth factor, managerial organization,
makes the synergistic combination possible. Managerial organiza-
tion, however, is irreplaceable, and unlike the other three factors, cannot
be regained except at an excessive cost.24 To management, economic
21. T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM 355-56 (1937) (emphasis omitted).
22. See notes 10 & 11 supra.
23. N. BUCHANAN, supra note 16, at 366-67.
We must not create the impression, on the other hand, that when business
enterprises fail they are always reorganized. Where only a small fraction of the
total investment is represented by capital goods with a high degree of specificity,
the alternative of liquidation is the better choice .... [An] important . . . factor
inducing liquidation rather than reorganization is that the total value of the
assets considered as individual items in separation is not greatly. different from
their value in the particular combination in which they happen to stand with
reference to one another at the time of failure. An insurance company's invest-
ments in bonds, mortgages, etc., derive little or none of their worth from the
fact that they happen to be contained in one portfolio; on the other hand, a rail-
road line is something more than a pile of steel rails, wooden sleepers, tieplates,
and six inch spikes. . . . Liquidation is called for in the [first] but reorganization
in the [second].
Id. (emphasis in original).
24. P. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 213-14 (1946) [hereinafter cited
as DRUCKER].
Note that to a certain extent, the relative priority rule mirrors this view.
The relative priority rule holds that in the absence of bad faith or fraud, the alloca-
tion of securities in a reorganization should be determined by arms length bargaining
among the participants including the debtor's management. See 2 BONRIGHT, THE
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 864-70 (1937); 2 DEWING, FINANCIAL POLICIES OF COR-
[VOL. 20: p. 302
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policy must be designed to preserve the ultimate expression of man-
agerial organization, the corporation. Bankruptcy laws are viewed
as efforts to save this factor of production, the social interest of
a production-oriented society in the survival of corporate identity
and productive integrity being almost absolute. To a certain extent,
all these policies are recognized by the reorganization court under the
guise of "maintaining the going concern value of the debtor.1 25
The basic legal issue is much simpler: Should the company be
liquidated or not? The traditional method for determining the answer
to this issue is that of valuing the enterprise as a going concern and
comparing this to its liquidation value.28 If the liquidation value is
greater, then the firm should be dismantled. The standard of feasi-
bility requires that at least this much be done, thus making the ex-
tensive valuation process as important to the feasibility question as
it is to the absolute priority rule."
While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss all in-
stances where liquidation is preferred over reorganization, it should
be noted that even a plan of liquidation subject to Chapter X must
also meet the statutory test of feasibility.2 Neither case law nor the
relevant statutes make an exception for plans of reorganization that
by their terms contemplate a gradual liquidation.2" Of course, feasi-
bility in this context must have a slightly different meaning, stressing
the realization of maximum asset values with minimal deception of
PORATIONS 1299-1304 (5th ed. 1953) ; Swaine, A Decade of Railroad Reorganization
Under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1203-10.
See note 39 infra. See also note 157 infra, with respect to the Proposed Act's
allowance of participation in a reorganization based upon management skills.
25. See notes 307, 308 and accompanying text infra.
26. See generally Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416 (1941), rev'd on other
grounds, 39 F. Supp. 846 (D. La. 1941) ; Cary, Liquidation of Corporations in Bank-
ruptcy Reorganizations, 60 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1946).
27. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 525 (1941),
where the Court stated: "Findings as to the earnings capacity of an enterprise are
essential to a determination of the feasibility as well as the fairness of a plan of re-
organization." Id. Contra, In re Universal Lub. Sys., Inc., 150 F.2d 832, 835 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 744 (1945), wherein the Third Circuit refused to value
the debtor by capitalization of earning because there were no "earnings" to capi-
talize - past earnings were nonexistent, and present earnings were due entirely to
the war effort. Yet the court approved as feasible a reorganization plan providing for
continuation of the business. Id. at 834-35. On the mechanics of valuation, see generally
6A COLLIER, supra note 2, 11.05; Field, Valuation for the Purpose of Corporate
Reorganization, 16 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 13 (1943) ; Gardner, The SEC and Valuation
Under Ch. X, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 440 (1943).
For a discussion of the absolute priority rule, see note 39 infra.
28. In re Webb & Knapp, Inc., Civil No. 65-B-365 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 7, 1975);
In re Mortgage Guar. Co., 36 F. Supp. 988 (D. Md. 1941) ; Mortgage Guar. Co., 8
S.E.C. 499, 509 (1941) ; Reynolds Inv. Co., 6 S.E.C. 699, 704 (1940).
29. Pennsylvania Timber Co., 4 S.E.C. 630, 634-35 (1939).
8
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the investing public." It is not precisely clear how the concept of in-
vestor deception is derived from the statutory mandate of a feasible
plan. However, this theoietical problem has never troubled the SEC,
which, in its capacity as a party to the reorganization, sees itself as
actively concerned with every issue arising thereunder."' The net
effect is a merger of the Commission's role under the Bankruptcy
Act with its position as an administrator of the various Securities
Acts. It seems to have consistently defined deception in the broadest
possible terms without regard to the applicability vel non of the anti-
fraud provisions of the Securities Acts, and has viewed deceptive
securities as automatically violative of the feasibility standard.If new- investment is necessary to* proceed with a plan of reorgani-
zation, the court faces an additional task. It must assume the func-
tion of the capital markets as the allocator of investment funds. In
this role, the court must decide whether the investments should be
made, and if so; under what terms and conditions, using as a. guide
the hypothetical results of an arms-length bargain in the same factual
situation. Additionally, the court must guard against realization of
windfall profits by insiders, and must -take steps to prevent deception
of new investors. Finally, the decision to liquidate or reorganize will
clearly-be affected by the extent to which the reorganization court, or
the SEC, facilitates or impairs the task of securing any new capital
required for a feasible reorganization. 2
If the court determines that the debtor's business should con-
tinue, it has determined only the reorganization value of the company,
and not the market value. Market value is a real value which cannot
only be expressed in monetary terms, but realized in cash. The courts
do not deal with market value of the debtor.
[T]he market value of a distressed business or its assets is not
to govern the rights of those financially interested in the com-
pany. More particularly the creditors are not to foreclose and
force a sale or valuation of assets at prevailing market prices.
Instead junior interests are to be protected from forced sales
and the impact of unfavorable market conditions. It is the fulfill-
30. Mortgage Guar. Co., 8 S.E.C. 499, 512-13 (1941); Reynolds Inv. Co., 6
S.E.C. 699, 708-09 (1940). Cf. Pennsylvania Timber Co., 4 S.E.C. 630, 634-35 (1939).
31. 5 SEC ANN. REP. 17 (1940).
32. The typical example involves a debtor which merely lacks cash. See note
234 infra. However, the SEC has also objected to the extreme situation involving a
company that is a mere shell potentially available for a promoter's investment scheme.
Bevis Shell Homes, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 982, 988-90 (1964); Memorandum of the SEC,
In re Realsite, Inc., Civil No. 63-244-Bk. (S.D. Fla., filed July 5, 1963), noted in
35 SEC ANN. REP. 166 (1969). Cf. In re Tower Credit Corp., Civil No. 66-171-
Bk-T (M.D. Fla., filed August 4, 1966), noted in 36 SEC ANN. REP. 183-85 (1970).
[VOL. 20 : p. 302
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ment of this principle which has produced the primary substantive
content of our reorganization system. 3
The policy reasons for this conclusion have been fully explored over
the years ;4 therefore further elaboration is not necessary. It is suffi-
cient to emphasize the distinction between reorganization value and
market value. Reorganization value is what the court believes the
market value of the insolvent company would be if the past were for-
gotten, and if the corporation would function as the court expects ik
to in the future.3 5 It is a purely fictional value which is not realizable
in dollars. In fact, it is helpful not to express it as a dollar amount;
rather one should think of it in terms of "reorganization tickets" -
pieces of paper (stocks, bonds, etc.) which represent a right to par-
ticipate in the reorganization. Reorganization value, whether deter-
mined by creditors, stockholders, the trustee, the SEC, or the courts,
is never the estimate of a person who is willing to invest his own
resources. Accordingly, -it is a matter of opinion and belief, and can-
not be objectively ascertained or verified. 6
B. The Link Between the Absolute Priority Rule
and Feasibility
The issue of fairness arises because reorganization value and
market value are not the same, and because it is virtually impossible to
predict in advance what the relationship between the two values will
be. If reorganizations were predicated upon real dollar value, presum-
ably cash or its equivalent in securities would be allotted to the creditors
in the order of their contractual priorities. No problem of fairness would
arise when a creditor with a $100 claim received $100 in cash or a
security with a market value of $100. Conversely, the problem would
be evident if that same creditor were to receive either $80 or $120 in
cash. However, no objective allocation is possible when the medium
of payment is the reorganization ticket, which lacks a specific dollar
value." Given this situation, someone must decide whether the dis-
33. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 566.
34. Id. at 565-71.
35. Id. at 578.
36. Id. at 572.
37. The classic distinction between payment in cash and payment in reorganiza-
tion tickets was recognized in Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 194 Misc.
628, 86 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 277 App. Div. 767, 97 N.Y.S.2d 542
(1st Dept. 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 658, 98 N.E.2d 474 (1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
819 (1951). In this decision, which involved the reorganization of the Denver & Rio
Grande Western Railroad, the senior bondholders were given new securities in the
reorganized company equal in face amount to the face amount of the debt. The old
senior bonds, however, were secured by certain collateral that had not been subject
to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. After completion of the reorganization, the 10
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tribution of these tickets was fair and equitable. The guidelines
specified in the bankruptcy statute are referred to as the absolute
priority rule.
38
An extensive discussion of the absolute priority rule is beyond the
scope of this article ;89 however, it is important to note that the rule
might require that creditors be paid in securities of the reorganized
enterprise that can be sold at face value immediately4 ° or at some
reasonably proximate time in the future.4 If feasibility standards are
New York court was forced to decide between competing claims for the collateral.
The old junior bondholders, who as a class had received only partial compensation
in the reorganization, claimed the collateral upon the ground that the senior bond-
holders had already been made whole in the reorganization. However, the court
awarded the collateral to the old senior bondholders, holding that "the pledge [of
collateral] was made under contract which guaranteed full payment of the [senior]
bonds . . . actually and not merely fictionally and constructively." 194 Misc. at 632-33,
86 N.Y.S.2d at 510 (emphasis supplied).
38. The absolute priority rule, in its basic form, provides that in reorganization
plans, creditor interests are superior to shareholder interests (and secured creditor
interests are superior to unsecured creditor interests), and must be satisfied in full
before any satisfaction of the shareholder interest (or unsecured creditor interest)
occurs. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115-16 (1939).
39. For an extensive discussion, see, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. v. Dubois, 312
U.S. 510 (1941) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939);
Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganization: New
Directions, 67 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1954); Billyou, New Directions: A Further Com-
inent, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1379 (1954) ; Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in
Corporate Reorganizations: A Reappraisal, 25 U. CM. L. REV. 417 (1958) ; Blum,
The "New Directions" for Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 67 HARV.
L. REV. 1367 (1954) ; Bonbright & Bergerman, Two Rival Theories of Priority Rights
of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 127 (1928) ;
Brudney, The Investment-Value Doctrine and Corporate Readjustments, 72 HARV.
L. REV. 645 (1959) ; Gilchrist, "Fair and Equitable" Plan of Reorganization: A
Clearer Concept, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 592 (1941) ; Graham, Fair Reorganization Plans
Under Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 8 BROOKLYN L. REV. 137 (1938); Guthman,
Absolute Priority in Reorganization, 45 CoLuM. L. REV. 739 (1945); Radin, Fair,
Feasible and in the Public Interest, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 451 (1941).
The Bankruptcy Commission has proposed revising the absolute priority rule
to relax the standard by which full payment of creditors is determined. See Proposed
Act §§ 7-303(3), (4) to 310(d) (2) (B) ; I BANKRUPTCY CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra
note 4, at 257-58; II BANKRUPTCY CoMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 4, at 254-55;
Blum & Kaplan, The Absolute Priority Doctrine, 41 U. Cni. L. REV. 651 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Blum & Kaplan, Absolute Priority]; Note, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1786 (1974).
40. See Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act, 48
HARV. L. REV. 39, 77-78 (1934).
41. See Frank, Epithetical Jurisprudence and the Work of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in the Administration of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act,
18 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 317, 340 (1941). In this regard, Judge Frank, former Chairman
of the SEC, stated:
[The SEC believes] that senior securityholders are entitled to receive more than
mere paper securities of a face amount equal to their claims; and that the securi-
ties they receive should be such as to give them really compensatory treatment
for their claims. In other words, the new securities should be intrinsically sound,
so that there is a reasonable prospect that they will have values equal to their
face amounts, or in the case of stocks, equal to the values put upon them for
reorganization purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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designed to insure the existence of a healthy reorganized debtor whose
securities are not selling at a substantial discount, then this full satis-
faction rule may also be a test of feasibility.
The fairness and feasibility requirements also interact in another
manner. The number~of creditors and old shareholders sharing in the
reorganized venture will be determined by the valuation of that enter-
prise. The higher the value, the greater the number of people "satisfied
in full" with reorganization tickets in the reorganized debtor and, quite
obviously, the lower the valuation, the lesser the number of people who
will participate. If there were some way to maximize this value, it
would seem to follow that those participants receiving less than full
compensation would be eager to use it. Most financial theory is directed
toward this end of maximizing the value of the firm, and the conven-
tional wisdom holds that, within appropriate limits, the inclusion of
debt or senior securities in the capital structure increases the total value
of the firm and is actually advantageous to the holders of the equity.
Beyond some optimal point, however, the inclusion of incremental units
of debt will have the opposite effect. This phenomenon can be con-
sidered the result of two separate factors: (1) the leverage effect, and
(2) the influence of the tax laws (by reason of the deductibility of
interest payments on debt, and the nondeductibility of preferred and
common stock dividends).42 Thus, there is an optimal capital struc-
ture with respect to maximizing the value of the firm. At that point, the
enterprise's average cost of capital will be at its lowest possible figure.
To the extent that the feasibility requirement controls the mix of securi-
ties to be issued, it interacts with the fairness requirement by affect-
ing the value of the debtor.
This argument must be kept in mind when discussing any aspect
of feasibility. While feasibility and fairness are separated for purposes
42. It should be noted that this view of the leverage effect has been challenged
by a number of financial theorists. See, e.g., Modigliani & Miller, The Cost of Capital,
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. EcoN. REV. 261 (1958).
The authors contended that no amount of debt will ever maximize the value of the firm.
They view the value of the firm as independent of capital structure. Even assuming
that the Modigliani-Miller position (M-M model) is correct, the effect of income
taxes will result in the existence of an optimal amount of debt. The arguments are
well summarized in BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 387-98. The M-M
model has little relevance to the bankruptcy situation because it assumes that "all
bonds . . . yield a constant income per unit of time, and this income is regarded as
certain by traders regardless of the issuer." Modigliani & Miller, supra, at 268.
Thus all bonds in the M-M model sell at the same price, based upon the percentage
share of return. However, in bankruptcy, the risk of default is as close to realization
as it ever becomes; and because in the aftermath of a bankruptcy, there is at least
a perceived risk of default, the reorganized debtor's bonds will be priced accordingly.
See generally Fisher, Determinants of Risk Premiums on Corporate Bonds, 67 J.
POL. ECON. 217 (1959) (attempting to determine what characteristics of a corporation
causes its debt instrument to yield a rate higher than the riskless rate). 12
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of analysis, in reality they are constantly interacting. It is not only the
raw amount of debt which affects the valuation of the enterprise; almost
any other facet of feasibility can have at least a psychological effect
upon the value of the firm. Perhaps one of the best known examples
of this is the increase in market price of corporate bonds due to the
presence of a sinking fund.43
One further note is in order. We have seen that for the purpose
of feasibility and fairness the court must determine the total value of
the enterprise. When distributing new participations in the reorganized
enterprise, the court must also fix the value of each of the new segments
awarded to the old security holders, to see that the latter "have been
made whole." 44 Many commentators have pointed out that it is the-
oretically possible for the sum of the values of the participations dis-
tributed to exceed the value of the enterprise as a whole.4" This result
indicates that the reorganization court should use an entirely different
technique: first, it should determine the new capital structure, thus
determining the basic issues of feasibility before those of fairness;
second, it should assign a measure of inherent risk to each of the seg-
ments of the expected earnings stream ;46 and finally, the reorganization
court should allocate these segments among the parties, with the most
certain segments being given to those participants with the highest
contractual priorities. This process may, in practice if not in logic,
produce a total value of the firm greater than that which a nonsegmented
valuation approach would produce, thus allowing more to participate
in the reorganized venture. 47
In any case, differential tax treatment of the segments with respect
to both the debtor and the recipients of those segments could produce
the same effect. For example, a corporation which can take advantage
43. 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 239 (5th ed. 1953)
[hereinafter cited as DEWING].
44. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
45. See generally Blum, Full Priority and Full Compensation in Corporate
Reorganizations, A Reappraisal, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 417 (1958); Brudney, supra
note 39; BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 147.
46. For example, the court should determine the percentage risk associated with
earning the first $10,000 to pay bond interest, the percentage risk associated with
earning the next $5,000 to pay preferred stock dividends, and so on.
47. The SEC and the ICC appear to have different valuation approaches, although
the theoretical underpinnings of each agency's technique remains unclear. In Chapter
X, the SEC estimates the future earnings and life expectancy of the enterprise as
a whole, determines the appropriate capitalization rate, and then computes the value
of the reorganized firm. The ICC, in section 77 proceedings, also starts with an esti-
mate of the enterprise's total expected earnings, always taking the stream of earnings
in perpetuity, but does not explicitly choose a single capitalization rate, nor does it
reveal a final figure for reorganization value. The ICC only calculates "how large a
capitalization can be supported by the predicted earnings." See, e.g., Ecker v. Western
Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 457-61 (1942). The ICC's technique was described in con-
siderable detail by Swaine, supra note 14, at 1198-99.
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of the intercorporate dividend exclusion4" might desire participation
in the reorganized enterprise in preferred stock form rather than the
same participation in income bonds. However, an individual might
not prefer one form over the other. If a participant has a loss upon his
holdings, and would like to recognize that loss, the value to him of the
kind of participation that will allow this loss to be recognized will be
different from that of the same treatment to the person who has no
losses, or who has losses but no gains against which to offset them. 9
C. Negotiation Dynamics
The remaining interaction between fairness and feasibility is
merely a corollary to the factors previously described. The new cap-
italization will necessarily equal the reorganization value as determined
by the court. Initially, it might seem that the easiest way to allocate
the new participations would be to give the old senior creditors what
they had, with the old junior creditors receiving any reorganization
tickets that may be left over. However, this is rarely possible; and to
the extent that feasibility limits fixed charges against the reorganized
enterprise, the old seniors will generally have the nature of their par-
ticipations changed. The compensation for the deterioration of quality
that invariably results must of necessity come out of the old juniors'
shares. This of course gives rise to inevitable argument.
First, the juniors will try to influence the court to offer the seniors
exactly what they had had before - a substantial amount of debt. The
resulting enterprise would be highly leveraged, but the juniors would
have nothing to lose by trying.5"
Second, the juniors will try to endow the new reorganization
tickets with what Professor Blum has aptly described as "rococo
qualities," 51 in the hope that these features will be treated as compen-
48. INT. Rv. CODE OF 1954, § 243. Section 243 entitles a corporation to a special
deduction of 85 percent of dividends received from a domestic corporation subject to
the income tax. Id.
49. See text accompanying notes 71-83 infra.
50. There is authority which supports the use of prior issues for participation in
the reorganized corporation. See Guthman, supra note 39, at 748-49. Guthman lists the
generous use of prior bonds and preferred stock as a desirable reorganization tech-
nique. He contends that this use is desirable because it has the following advantages:
(1) the total market value of the securities is maximized;
(2) the distributable income is increased to the extent that interest charges,
unlike dividends, reduce the income subject to income taxes;(3) priorities are more easily defined and preserved;
(4) the reorganization is speeded by a plan that preserves priorities and so far
as possible gives the same kind of securities as previously owned to the
various groups of claimants.
51. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 584.
14
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sation for the reduction of the quality in the new senior participation. 2
The variety of capital structures suggested by parties to Chapter X
reorganizations pays tribute to the inventiveness of counsel for the
junior interests in this area:
Finally, if both of the above tactics fail, the juniors will rely upon
their last weapon, delay, a factor which always favors the junior in-
terests. If the juniors are the former holders of common stock, they
are able to continue the busineqs of the debtor, albeit most often under
a trustee, using the assets which now belong to the old seniors. These
assets are therefore subjected to all the risks of the marketplace, with
any possible gain limited to accumulation of interest. Since the old
seniors probably invested with the expectation of a fixed cash return, they
want to settle the issue quickly in order that the steady cash flow might
begin once more. Conversely, the juniors were willing to forego this
fixed return and speculate upon the increase in residual values over time,
and therefore are content to wait, hoping that the outlook for the debtor
will improve, be it by better management, a change in economic con-
ditions, war, or sheerest luck.
Into this situation comes the SEC, armed, of course, with its
feasibility guidelines. The feasibility concept limits the range of solutions
the parties may formulate. With respect to the first two tactics, feasibility
mandates that certain solutions not be accepted as a matter of policy.
The public must be protected, either from the economic and social
consequences of another imminent bankruptcy, or from the risks of
future investment in a venture inherently deceptive both upon a macro-
economic scale in terms of imperfect allocation of new investment, and
upon a microeconomic scale, in terms of the sale of overvalued and de-
ceptive securities to individual investors. The standard of feasibility is
designed to protect this public interest.5" With respect to the third
tactic, the courts have yet to formulate an adquate solution.
The determination of feasibility is within the competence of the
district judge, subject to review only upon a "clearly erroneous" stand-
ard.54 Such a determination, as does any other finding mandated by the
Bankruptcy Act, "calls for an informed, independent judgment" by the
52. Attorneys and security holders are attempting to develop new forms of quali-
tative compensation. Among the suggested forms is the use of an abnormally high
sinking or purchase fund, payable out of earnings, to retire the securities distributed
to the old senior creditors. Payment to this fund would be a condition precedent to
the payment of dividends upon the new common stock that had been distributed to the
old junior creditors. See Swaine, supra note 14, at 1212.
53. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 584.
54. Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 444, rehearing denied, 391 U.S.
909 (1968) ; In re Spectrum Arena, Inc., 462 F.2d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Muskegon
Motor Spec. v. Davis, 366 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1966); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
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judge.5 This procedure clearly precludes the practice which existed
under the old section 77B whereby courts frequently viewed the feasi-
bility of a proposed plan as a matter of business judgment, a matter
much better determined by the parties to the reorganization than by
the court.56
The SEC has the responsibility of providing the court with an
impartial, expert opinion addressed to the problems faced in this area.5
Although the Commission's reports are only advisory in nature, and
the courts have frequently disagreed with the SEC, its influence whether
by appearance and oral argument, or by formal written report, cannot
be denied.
III. THE SEC AND FEASIBILITY
A. Introduction
Throwing the corporation into bankruptcy was a little dif-
ferent from an equity receivership, though it is impossible to say
exactly where the difference lay. Lawyers, however, felt that the
equity receivership was a little better because they themselves had
invented all the rules in this procedure, and they were not bothered
by the legislature as in bankruptcy. Hence the equity receivership
was preferred, but if a student wanted to ask a lawyer just why,
he got no such simple explanation. Instead he was referred to a
large number of books. The subject was simply too colossal to be
talked about simply ....
No one was permitted to talk naturally about the facts of
financial life and politics.1 s
However, Congress sent the SEC to the rescue. As designed, its
function is to bring the truth about the financial problems of the debtor
55. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510, 520 (1941), citing
National Sur. Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426, 436 (1932) ; Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939), citing National Stir. Co. v. Coriell, 289 U.S. 426,
436 (1932).
56. In re A.C. Hotel Co., 93 F.2d 841, 843 (7th Cir. 1937) ; See also In re Gibson
Hotels, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 859, 866-67 (S.D.W.Va. 1938) ; In re Baldwin Loc. Works,
21 F. Supp. 94, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
57. H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1938). In recommending the
revision of the Bankruptcy Act, the House Committee on the judiciary contemplated:
The court will have the benefit of expert and disinterested advice to aid it in the
solution of the complicated financial and legal problem [sic] involved in the
typical large reorganization. This should fill a long-felt need and be welcomed
by both courts and investors. It should provide a further check on the exercise
of reorganization powers and give additional assurance that the interests of
investors will be served.
Id. Under the Proposed Act, the duties of the SEC will be transferred to a new
United States Bankruptcy Administration. I BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra.
note 4, at 7-8, 248-49. 16
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out into the open. As a party to the proceeding and as expert advisor,
the SEC places its facilities at the disposal of the court.5" The bank-
ruptcy court in all cases may, and if the corporation's indebtedness
exceeds $3 million, must, submit a reorganization plan to the SEC."
The court may not approve a plan so submitted until the SEC has
filed its advisory report or has notified the court that it will not file
one."' Since the Commission's report will eventually go to the stock-
holders or creditors,6 2 the SEC is forced to use a minimum of "legalese"
and a maximum of the straight talk that reorganization proceedings
were so desperately in need of before the Chandler Act.
The SEC, in carrying out the statutory mandate, takes the issue
of feasibility quite seriously. First, the SEC regards it to be axiomatic
that one reorganization is enough for any company.
Although security holders' representatives frequently regard the
fairness of the plan as their principal concern, the full protection of
their interests requires also that the plan be feasible so that it will
not hamper future operations or compel another reorganization. 03
As the SEC staff wrote a large portion of Chapter X,14 the Commis-
sion's reputation as an expert in the feasibility area would be some-
what tarnished if a debtor whose plan it had approved as feasible were
to require a second reorganization.
Second, the SEC, which now views itself as the guardian of the
securities market, insists that the "new securities shall not by their
terms or otherwise be deceptive to subsequent purchasers." 65 This issue
is not confined solely to the question of whether or not a worthless
security is deceptive, although the SEC often speaks in such terms.
The SEC also closely scrutinizes and regulates the material printed
upon the securities. For example, it insists that an income bond be
referred to as a preferred stock. As a consequence, the SEC views the
"standard" forms of securities as nondeceptive, and therefore a plan
with too much embellishment has less chance of obtaining SEC ap-
proval. 66
59. In re Otis & Co., 104 F. Supp. 201, 203 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 572 (1970).
61. Id. § 573 (1970).
62. Id. § 575 (1970). Recent economic developments have caused a tenfold
increase in the work of the SEC. The Commission reviewed 117 reorganization
petitions in fiscal 1974, but it estimates it will process 1,225 petitions in the current
fiscal year and 1,300 in fiscal 1976. The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 4, 1975, at 4, col. 6.
63. 8 SEC ANN. REP. 28 (1942). See generally Broadway-Exchange Corp., 15
S.E.C. 256, 267-71 (1944).
64. PROTECTIVE COMm. REPORT, pt. VIII (1940).
65. 8 SEC ANN. REP. 28 (1942). However, securities issued in a Chapter X
reorganization are exempt from the prospectus requirements of the Securities Act of
1933. See generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 584-88 (2d ed. 1961).
66. According to Professor Blum, feasibility standards "probably include a re-
striction on trimming new securities with rococo qualities which tend to be misleading
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The SEC's third bias evinces itself in the Commission's attempts to
slow down the initial reorganization machinery in certain cases, thereby
preventing an opportunist from rushing the court into a premature
judgment. The tangled web of conflicts and the immense valuation
problems posed by a dying venture are more than sufficient to tax the
limits of the judicial process. 7 The Commission insists that time be
taken to develop an adequate record as to the prospects of the debtor,
particularly its future earning capacity, before the court examine any
plan."8 The assets of a faltering business are not to be disposed of
until there has been a sufficient opportunity to determine what disposi-
tion will be most advantageous to all the interested parties,"9 nor can the
trustee propose a swift reorganization to avoid a complete investigation
of the old management.70 If the trustee is in the midst of making sig-
nificant changes in the debtor, such as selling off a large percentage
of nonincome producing assets, then the SEC insists that no reasonable
estimate of future earnings be made until the extent and effectiveness
of these changes is clear. The emphasis is upon predictability; the
SEC will not grant its approval until there is an accurate and complete
picture of the future earning capacity of the reorganized debtor.
Perhaps it is proper to add a fourth bias to this list. The SEC
deals with investors and how they invest their money. It is not con-
cerned with taxes; rather, it views tax consequences as within the sole
province of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Thus, since tax
matters are "the I.R.S.' business, if they want to be a party to the
and make intelligent judgments by investors more difficult." Blum, The Law, supra
note 4, at 584.
67. Blum and Kaplan explain: "[R]eorganizations under Chapter X . . . involve
some of the law's most difficult problems of analysis, adjustment of rights, and litiga-
tion." Blum & Kaplan, Absolute Priority, supra note 39, at 654.
68. Aireon Mfg. Corp., 28 S.E.C. 522, 534-35 (1948); Preliminary Memo-
randum of SEC (March 9, 1973), Memorandum of SEC (March 27, 1973), In re
San Francisco & Oak. Heli. Air., Inc., No. B-70-5175 (N.D. Cal., filed July 31, 1970),
noted in 38 SEC ANN. REP. 122-23 (1972); Memorandum of SEC (March 26, 1971),
In re John Rich Ent., No. B-42-70 (D. Utah, filed Jan. 16, 1970), noted in 37 SEC
ANN. REP. 187-89 (1971). See generally Protective Comm. v. Anderson, 390 U.S.
414 (1968).
69. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 566. This is particularly true where the
trustee proposes to sell all the assets to a buyer who insists upon an immediate sale.
Cf. In re Solar Mfg. Corp., 176 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1949). In Solar, the proposed
"emergency" sale by the trustee involved a price of $525,000, and the assets were
eventually sold for $815,000. 16 SEC ANN. REP. 118 (1950). See In re American
Bantam Car Co., No. 21881 (W.D. Pa., filed April 19, 1950), noted in 17 SEC ANN.
REP. 126 (1951). The Commission has always been suspicious of proposed emergency
sales. See generally 39 SEC ANN. REP. 120-21 (1973).
70. Texas Gas Util. Co., No. 2238 (W.D. Tex., filed Sept. 4, 1951), noted in 18
SEC ANN. REP. 145-46 (1952). 18
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reorganization, they can become one."'" Unfortunately, it is more than
simply the concern of the IRS - it is very much a concern of the
participants who have a great deal of money involved in the decision.
Chapter X reorganizations are governed by sections 37172 and 372'3 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and a transfer of assets from the
old corporation to a new corporation for the latter's "stock or securities,"
which transfer meets the requirements of these sections, will result in
nonrecognition of gain or loss to the corporation on the transfer. The
basis of the assets in the hands of the old corporation carries over to the
new corporation,7 4 and no gain or loss will be recognized by the share-
holders or creditors.7 5 In addition, the "continuity of interest" require-
ment 76 applies to reorganizations pursuant to section 371. 7 7 Without
elaboration, it has been held that the creditors of an insolvent enterprise
will usually be regarded as the owners of the equity of the emerging
corporation and thus will be treated as holding the continuity of interest
trait. 78  The kinds of reorganization tickets that these participants
receive will thus determine the applicability of these nonrecognition
provisions. 7 1 The tax objectives of the parties may be in conflict, with
71. Comment of former SEC employee Bob Ginzburg upon being asked if the
SEC ever considered the tax incidents of a reorganization plan, March 13, 1974.
See also Imperial "400," Inc., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 313 (Aug.
29, 1973), 2 S.E.C. Docket 377, 389 (1973), where the SEC declared that an uncer-
tain tax status after the acquisitive reorganization would not delay the Commission's
approval of the plan, because "[n]ot every means for consummating a plan must be
firmly established in all their intricate details in order to merit judicial approval of
the plan." Id. This seems inconsistent with the SEC's general reluctance to approve
of anything with an uncertain future. The SEC otherwise requires that a plan be
detailed and complete, and the failure to provide concrete programs concerning opera-
tional and financial changes is a factor in the determination that a plan is not feasible.
In re Imperial "400" Nat., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 959 (D.N.J. 1974). Further, it
would appear deceptive to distribute securities without an indication of whether the
transaction is taxable. But cf. Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 198 (1945).
72. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 371.
73. Id. § 372.
74. Id. Note the SEC's early actions in actively seeking to have section 270 of
the Bankruptcy Act (dealing with tax basis) modified in favor of the debtor. 6 SEC
ANN. REP. 57-59 (1940).
75. NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 371(b).
76. This doctrine generally requires that the owners of the former corporation re-
tain a continuing equity interest in the reorganized debtor. See B. BITTKER & J. Eus-
TICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 14.11 (1971).
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(a)(4) (1955).
78. Helvering v. Alabama Asph. Lime. Co., 315 U.S. 179, 181-84 (1940). See
generally Darrell, Creditor's Reorganizations and the Federal Income Tax, 57 HARV.
L. REV. 1009 (1944) ; Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 HARV.
L. REV. 705 (1945). The Proposed Act may undercut this treatment by modifying
the absolute priority rule. See Plumb, The Tax Recommendations of the Commission
on the Bankruptcy Laws - Reorganizations, Carryovers and the Effects of Debt
Reduction, 29 TAX. L. REV. 229, 239-43 (1974).
79. Interacting with the continuity of interest problem is the question of what
constitutes "securities" for the purpose of section 371 (b) of the Internal Revenue
Code. See Treas. Reg. § 1.371-1(a) (5). A related ki p iq vle thl 4-, +- -. .
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some desiring to avoid 'nonrecognition treatment in order to take im-
mediate advantage of a loss, while others who acquired their interests
upon a speculative basis and who may actually have a gain might desire
to defer recognition of that gain to some time in the future. When the
debtor is acquired by a presently operating corporation, as opposed to
a corporation formed specifically for the purpose of reorganization, the
tax picture becomes even more confused."0
An acquiring corporation may also desire to preserve and carry
over the corporate net earnings loss, capital loss, or deficit in earnings
and profits. 81 If there is a substantial earnings and profits account, it
may be advantageous to attempt to eliminate that account. The reor-
ganization can also be structured to avoid recognition of any discharge
of indebtedness income and recapture of depreciation and investment
credits. Even the debtor's methods of accounting will have to be consid-
ered in structuring the reorganization. As a result, the participants may
differ among themselves as to tax objectives, and may differ with the
management that will emerge from the reorganization. Although the
SEC does not object to the proponents arranging their plans wi.th spe-
cific tax objectives in mind,8 2 -there is no indication that the SEC or the
avoid the problem by treating "securities" as "property" under section 361 of the Code,
so that where the exchanging shareholder is a corporation, it can avoid section 371 and
utilize section 361. Compare Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 599
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 726-27 (1945), with Seiberling Rubber Co. v.
Commissioner, 169 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1948).
The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States would amend
several sections of the Code to make the tax treatment of Chapter X reorganizations
similar to that of other corporate reorganizations. I BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 4, at 277-97. See Plumb, supra note 78, at 239-43.
80. Tillinghast & Gardner, Acquisitive Reorganizations and Chapter X and XI
of the Bankruptcy Act, 26 TAX. L. REV. 663 (1971).
81. Krantz, Loss Carryovers in Chapter X Reorganizations, 16 TAX. L. REV. 359,
361 (1961); Glancy, Carrying Losses Through Chapters X and XI Reorganizations,
28 TAX LAW. 27 (1974). Note that this net operating loss carryforward is an
asset of the debtor, even if it can not be sold as such, and enters into the valuation of
the debtor. See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 954-56 (D.N.J. 1974).
82. See, e.g., In re Phoenix Gems Inc., No. B-21072 (D. Ariz., filed Dec. 23,
1971), noted in 38 SEC ANN. REp. 123-24 (1972); Memorandum of SEC, In re
Riker Del. Corp., No. B-597-67 (D.N.J., filed April 21, 1967), noted in 37 SEC
ANN. REP. 185 (1971).
Under the plan of reorganization filed by the debtor in Riker, unsecured
creditors would receive $250,000 in cash and 5 percent convertible debentures in the
principal amount of $2.25 million. A secured creditor, the plan's proponent, was to
supply the cash needed to consummate the plan ($500,000), and was to receive
1,440,000 shares of the common stock of the reorganized company. Holders of the
old preferred and common shares were also to receive 360,000 shares of the new
common stock, or 20 percent of the total outstanding, even though the creditors were
not receiving full compensation for their claims. The only reason for this allocation
was tax oriented, and the Commission acknowledged this; it held that the participa-
tion of the old stockholders was still fair and equitable and met the requirements of
the absolute priority rule. The plan's proponent, according to the SEC, was entitled
to all the common stock of the reorganized venture for his contribution of fresh
20
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courts have considered either who should be benefited, or if a party
should receive tax benefits, whether such benefits should be considered
as compensation to it. Further, there is certainly no indication why
the SEC does not view the failure to reveal these tax incidents as
deceptive."3 The area remains open to bargaining among the parties.
B. Amount of Debt
Perhaps no other issue represents to both the courts and the SEC
the concept of feasibility more than a discussion of the amount of debt
a corporation may safely issue. The benefits of using debt are well
known, and the general dynamics of the reorganization bargaining
result in the SEC's serving as the proponent of a low debt structure.
In the late 1930's, keeping debt at a minimum was popular as the
plague of excessive debt financing was viewed as one of the major
causes of the great depression. The argument has continued for years,
and remains unsettled even today.
In 1948, one commentator was daring enough to summarize the
specific guidelines that the Commission then followed.8 4 No one has
since repeated his mistake, nor will this article attempt the impossible.
Circumstances have changed too much since the late 1930's to expect
the SEC to be completely consistent. Corporate debt has grown enor-
mously. With the publication of an important book advocating debt
financing,85 and the advent of a long, sustained boom in the economy,
the 1960's heard the final death knell to the "demon-debt" image, at
least as far as management was concerned. Yet the rhetoric of the
SEC indicates that the change has yet to reach Washington. When
capital, and the allotment, presumably for tax reasons, of 20 percent of the new
common to the old stockholders was a "gratuity" which the proponent was free to
grant since it was not at the expense of the creditors.
In Phoenix Gems, an acquisitive reorganization with a healthy small cor-
poration in a parallel line of business, the Commission approved a plan whereby the
reorganized debtor issued 80 percent of its shares to acquire all the stock of the
proponent's healthy firm, and 20 percent of its shares to others with claims against
the debtor.
83. Plans have been submitted to the court, conditioned upon favorable tax
rulings. In re Inland Gas Corp., Nos. 12861-67 (E.D. Ky., filed Oct. 14, 1935), noted
in 21 SEC ANN. REP. 91 (1954), 22 SEC ANN. REP. 174-75 (1955). Cf. note 71 supra.
84. Calkins, supra note 4, at 769. Calkins concluded:
[T]he maximum amount of senior issues considered feasible by the Com-
mission, and likely to be approved by the courts, will consist of bonds and other
fixed debt obligations which (1) have an overall fixed-charge coverage (interest
and sinking fund requirements) of approximately three times for industrial firms
and two times for public utilities, (2) have an asset-protection ratio of between
100% and 200%, preferably in the form of fixed assets, and (3) do not exceed
50% of the capital structure.
Id.
85. G. DONALDSON, CORPORATE DEBT CAPACITY (1961) [hereinafter cited as
DONALDSON].
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presented today with the argument that a debtor should be allowed to
use a high percentage of debt to secure a tax advantage, the SEC
responds with the same "answer" it offered in the 1940's:
It has also been urged that the creation of as large a bond
issue as is proposed will result in tax savings as compared with a
smaller funded debt or an all stock capital structure. We do not
believe that speculation as to the nature and extent of the tax
statutes which may be enacted in the immediate future or over
the life of the reorganized debtor is suitable or appropriate. How-
ever, even if tax savings can be predicted, that element should not
outweigh the necessity for a sound capital structure within the
limits of feasibility. In view of the uncertainty as to the debtor's
future earnings we are of the view that the bondholders' interests
would be best served by foregoing whatever tax advantage may
accrue from a bond issue to make more certain that resort by this
enterprise to the reorganization courts for the third time with the
attendant expense, delay and possible disruption of business will
not be necessary.8
The SEC appears to use several tests to determine whether or not
a plan provides for excessive debt. The primary test is one of the
earnings coverage; "[w]hether or not the earnings may reasonably
be expected to meet the interest and dividend requirements of the new
securities is a sine qua non to a determination of the integrity and
practicability of the new capital structure." '87 The SEC has always
viewed feasibility as requiring that there be "prospective earnings of
sufficient certainty, stability, and amount to warrant the imposition of
a fixed liability and to provide an adequate margin of safety for the
payment of interest and the retirement of bonds at their maturity
dates." 88  In 1948, one commentator stated that the SEC favored a
ratio of earnings three times the amount of the overall fixed charge
for industrial companies and a ratio of two times for public utilities. 9
Although the SEC rarely mentions specific coverage ratios, circum-
stances have changed. It is submitted that the minimum coverage ratio
for industrial companies is now between two and two and one-half.9"
86. Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 198 (1945) (footnotes omitted).
87. Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 525 (1941).
88. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 10 S.E.C. 714, 780 (1942). See also
Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 194 (1945).
89. Calkins, Feasibility, supra note 4, at 76, citing BADGER AND GUTHMAN,
INVESTMENT PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 316 (3d ed. 1941); GRAHAM AND DODD,
SECURITY ANALYSIS 156 (rev. ed. 1940).
90. See, e.g., Selected Inv. Corp., 39 S.E.C. 37, 51-52 (1959) (plan whose cover-
age was predicted to be as low as 2.3 times in a pro forma statement for the next 5
years approved as feasible); Four Seasons Nursing Centers of America, Inc., SEC
Corporate Reorganization Release No. 310, at 56-57 (March 16, 1972), [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. 64,399, at 73,975 (SEC 1972) (approving a
2.4 ratio). 22
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It should be noted that the earnings coverage should be realized
even in the lean years, thus necessitating an extensive examination of
the degree of fluctuation inherent in the debtor's earnings pattern."'
If the income is subject to such wide fluctuations that it is impossible
to predict how "lean" the lean years will be, the SEC insists that con-
tingent obligations be substituted for fixed ones.92 Obviously, there is
no absolute rule,9 3 and very often a combination issue with part fixed
and part contingent interests may be used. 4
The SEC also appears to use a second test, one that focuses upon
the balance sheet. The SEC believes that there should be a conservative
relation between assets upon one hand, and the fixed charge securities
upon the other. However, this relationship has not been precisely deter-
mined as the Commission has only mentioned it on rare occasions."
One commentator has indicated that the SEC prefers that the combined
value of funded debt and preferred stock issues not exceed the value
of fixed assets.96 The case law is not clear because the phrase "asset
value" is often used without indication of whether reference is being
made to tangible asset value or going concern value. In any case, it is
submitted that the SEC has abandoned this test, and it is doubtful that
it ever intended to use it.
The use of this balance sheet criterion where a debtor's earnings
are directly related to its historical costs can be rationalized. In the
reorganization of the Pittsburgh Railway Company, 7 the SEC urged
91. In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 129, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1943); Chicago
& W. Towns Ry., 35 S.E.C. 290, 295-300 (1953); Philadelphia & W. Ry., 13 S.E.C.
330, 332-35 (1943).
92. See, e.g., Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 7 S.E.C. 456, 539-40 (1940); Phila-
delphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 10 S.E.C. 714, 716 (1941). Accord, FINANCIAL
HANDBOOK § 22, at 12 (4th ed. J. Bogen 1964) : "If the earning power of a business
tends to disappear entirely in depressions, serious consideration should be given to
the substitution of contingent interest bonds or stock for all outstanding fixed interest
debt." Id.
93. While the SEC approved a plan with approximately 16 percent debt in the
reorganization of the Pittsburgh Railway Company, it noted that it "would prefer that
the capital structure of a company such as this contain no mortgage bonds in view of
the volatile nature of earnings in the Railroad industry and the practice of financing
equipment through direct debt obligations." Elmer E. Bauer, 31 S.E.C. 432, 440 (1950).
94. See, e.g., Broadway-Exchange Corp., 15 S.E.C. 256, 270-71 (1944); Cenwest
Corp., 15 S.E.C. 352, 360 (1940).
95. Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1 (1940) ; La France Indus., 5 S.E.C.
917 (1939).
96. Calkins, supra note 4, at 768, citing Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 7 S.E.C.
456 (1940). See Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1 (1940) ; La France Indus.,
5 S.E.C. 917 (1939). In Minnesota & Ontario Paper, the Commission approved as
feasible a bond issue that represented "not quite 50 percent of the total value for
reorganization of all the assets . . . and approximately 70 percent of the going con-
cern value of the fixed assets." 7 S.E.C. at 539.
97. The final Report of the SEC can be found at Elmer E. Bauer, 31 S.E.C. 432
(1950). The public utility commission's approval of the plan was required under
sections 177 and 178 of Chapter X. 11 U.S.C. §§ 577, 578 (1970).
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the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission to follow the technique of
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois98 and stress the capitaliza-
tion of estimated earnings. Although the issue revolved around finding
a total value for the enterprise, the Pennsylvania Commission insisted
upon valuing the debtor at original cost less accrued depreciation (or
depreciated reproduction cost if this was less) rather than capitalizing
the prospective earnings. 99 Stressing the function of a "rate base"
system of regulation the Public Utility Commission said:
We do not read the Rock Products decision as enunciating a
rule that prospective earning power is the sole criterion to apply
in formulating capital structures for utilities in process of re-
orgahization. The Rock Products case involved an industrial
company, whose charges and services are not affected with a public
interest ....
The prospective-earning-power-alone criterion, if applied to
utilities, might give rise to mischievous and vexatious situations.
A utility is entitled by law to a fair return, and no more, on the
fair value of its properties. A grossly over-capitalized utility under-
going reorganization might have present earnings sufficient, and
only sufficient, for a fair return on the fair value of its properties,
but its prospective earnings, if and when realized, might be substan-
tially in excess of a fair return on the then fair value of its properties.
.. On the other hand, if rates or fares were not reduced, so as to
enable interest and dividends to continue to be earned in full, the
public would be deprived of the reasonable rates on fares to which it
is entitled by law. A ceiling on reorganization securities - say
depreciated original cost or depreciated reproduction ccst, which-
ever is lower - would be a powerful deterrent to the arising of
such a vexatious situation, as such costs are elements of fair
value. 00
The courts, however, have adopted the SEC's position.'1"
A third test used by the SEC is one which compares the amount
of funded debt to the total capital structure. Again, a substantial amount
of speculation is involved in determining whether the SEC uses any
fixed standard. The figure of 50 percent has been suggested, 1 2 but it
has never received any direct support from the Commission as a stand-
ard. The cases in which the debt ratio has been specifically mentioned
98. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
99. W. D. George, PA. PuB. UTIL. Comm'N 65, 74-75 (1941).
100. Id. at 75.
101. See, e.g., In re Chicago Rys., 160 F.2d 59, 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 808 (1947), noted at 13 SEC ANN. RFP. 100-01 (1947). Unlike the decision
of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, this case was decided after the
Supreme Court's decision in Group of Inst. Inv. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R.,
318 U.S. 523 (1943), where the Supreme Court stressed the importance of valuation
by earning capacity in section 77 railroad reorganizations. Id. at 540-41.
102. Calkins, Feasibility, supra note 4, at 769. See also Inland Gas Corp., 36
_E.C. 224. 237 (1955): Island Gas Corp., 36 S.E.C. 285, 296-97 (1955).
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are not consistent,1°3 and the SEC has not always been persuasive in
arguing that it was too high.10 4 In sum, the debt ratio seems to have
little meaning when standing alone;1. yet at times, the Commission
has cited Judge Frank °0 and attempted to utilize the high debt ratio
argument:
Among the most important aspects of sound structure in the
Commission's opinion, is a reasonably small percentage of debt
and a substantial value behind the common stock equity. Much
of the financial disaster of the past, in its opinion, has been due to
top-heavy debts in corporate financial structures. Conversely, much
wild speculation and market manipulation is encouraged by the
existence of 'poker chip' equity securities with little or no value
behind them.
Thus in reorganization plans we condemn too heavy a load of
senior securities. This attitude is not inconsistent with our sup-
port of the rule of full compensation for senior claims .... On the
contrary, both positions discourage trading on a thin equity ....
C. General Terms of the Debt Issues
The SEC, acting out its role as guardian of the securities market,
has always insisted that the nature of any debt obligation had to be
clearly stated.'0 s For example, a company in liquidation should never
103. Compare Cenwest Corp., 15 S.E.C. 352, 360 (1944) (approving a real estate
company in which 78 percent of total capitalization was debt, stating that this was
the maximum permitted by the requirements of feasibility), and Third Ave. Transit
Corp., 37 S.E.C. 236, 242 (1956), Third Ave. Transit Corp., 37 S.E.C. 258, 271
(1956) (both approving a 69 percent debt ratio), with Keeshin Freight Lines, Inc.,
29 S.E.C. 724, 746-50 (1949) (54.8 percent debt was "top heavy," even though fixed
charges were covered "from 6 to 10 times, before federal income taxes and from 4
to 5 times for the first 6 years after federal income taxes.") Id. at 746.
104. See, e.g., Atlas Pipe. Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 441 (1941), wherein the SEC
disapproved of a plan calling for 93 percent of the capital structure to be senior
securities as unsound. Id. However, this plan was subsequently adopted by the court
in In re Atlas Pipe. Corp., 39 F. Supp. 846 (D. La. 1941). See Green River Steel
Corp., 37 S.E.C. 507, 524-25 (1957). There, the SEC concluded that a plan calling
for 96.3 percent debt was not feasible. However, this plan was also adopted by the
court in In re Green River Steel Corp., [1957-60 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
158,939 (N.D. Ky. 1957), noted in 23 SEC ANN. REP. 153-55 (1957).
105. In this regard, note the following New York Stock Exchange's standard for
delisting firms which combines an interest coverage and debt ratio test:
When the company . . . issues a debt security and . . . on a pro forma basis
after interest charges on all debt, including the new issue, there would be either
before or after income taxes and earnings deficit or earnings would be nominal
in amount - and - on a pro forma basis common stock equity is less than 25
percent of the capitalization.
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A-294 (1969).
106. See note 41 supra.
107. Frank, supra note 41, at 344-45 (footnotes omitted).
108. The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 must of course be complied with.- SEC
Trust Indenture Act of 1939 Release No. 31 (Jan. 4, 1945).
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issue certificates that clothe the enterprise with the appearance of an
ongoing venture.109
Subordination of the debt issues has given the SEC trouble, and
the SEC surely views subordination to future claims as being incon-
sistent with the inherent nature of a debt obligation," The Com-
mission also views contingent payment of interest as inconsistent with
the nature of debt obligations."' Generally, it sees no reason for the
label "income bonds," and contends that such obligations should be
called preferred stock." 2  As was previously mentioned, an obliga-
tion contingent in part appears to be acceptable, but the contingent
portion must have a reasonable chance of being earned, and the com-
pany should only be able to withhold payment of the interest as it is
earned under extraordinary circumstances." 3 Note that the tax sys-
109. See note 182 and accompanying text infra. In re Arlington Disc. Corp., No.
48421 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 3, 1967), noted in 37 SEC ANN. REP. 185-86 (1971).
110. In Greiss-Pfleger Tan. Co., 5 S.E.C. 72 (1939), the plan of reorganization
provided for issuance of "capital income debentures" having no lien against any asset
and being subordinate to all present and future creditors. Contingent but cumulative
interest was payable only from earnings, upon a sliding scale; the issue matured in
15 years, but was convertible into stock. The SEC insisted that this be called pre-
ferred stock. Id. at 82-84. However, the court approved the plan. 5 SEC ANN. REP.
19-20 (1940). See also Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1, 27 (1940).
111. See Arlington Disc. Corp., No. 48421 (S.D. Ohio, filed July 3, 1967), noted
in 37 SEC ANN. REP. 185-86 (1971). There, the debentures were "too contingent,"
and thus were illusory and deceptive.
112. See Green River Steel Corp., 37 S.E.C. 507, 525-26, 37 S.E.C. 568 (1957),
where the SEC concluded that it was inherently deceptive to label an issue as a
"debenture" where no interest was payable for the first 2 years and the noncumulative
interest was payable only if certain earnings after other interest and sinking fund
requirements had been met for that year and preceding years; Third Ave. Transit
Corp., 37 S.E.C. 113, 156 (1956); Chicago & W. Towns Ry., 35 S.E.C. 290 (1953).
See also Philadelphia & W. Ry., 13 S.E.C. 330 (1943).
113. Minnesota & Ont. Pape" Co., 7 S.E.C. 456, 541 (1940) ; Philadelphia & W.
Ry., 13 S.E.C. 330 (1943); Greiss-Pfleger Tan. Co., 5 S.E.C. 72 (1939).
Also revelant in this regard is the SEC's refusal to recognize the substantial
difference between taxation of an interest payment and that of a dividend payment.
In Chicago & W. Towns Ry., 35 S.E.C. 290 (1953), the SEC objected to a plan
providing for income bonds. In response to a claim that the bonds would provide a
greater tax advantage than stock, the Commission responded:
It may be urged, however, that the reorganized company may benefit from
reduced Federal income taxes if income bonds are issued. This is not persuasive.
The extent of such tax reduction, if any, would depend upon the company's
income for income tax purposes, the continuance of present tax statutes which
cannot be considered certain, and, of course, only on the actual payment of the
continent non-cumulative interest on the bonds. A factor such as possible ta -
reductions ought not to outweigh the necessity that reorganization produce
sound capital structure meeting the statutory requirements of feasibility.
Id. at 299 (footnotes omitted).
On the importance of this tax distinction in the regulated industry context,
see Stevens, Participating Debt Versus Other Securities in Capital Structure Readjust-
ments, 28 GEo. L.J. 1021 (1940). Note that the courts are not bound to accept the
SEC's advice, and often they do not. E.g., In re Greiss-Pfleger Tan. Co. (S.D. Ohio
1939), noted in Calkins, Feasibility, supra note 4, at 769 n.28; In re Green River
Steel Corp., [1957-60 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. 1 58,939 (N.D. Ky. 1957)
In re Philadelphia & W. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
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tem also operates upon the recipient level: a corporate creditor might
wish to have preferred stock rather than debt because of the inter-
corporate dividend exemption, or debt rather than stock if there are
statutory bars to holding equity. There is no indication that the SEC
considers those preferences in forming its policy of insisting upon
"pure" as opposed to "hybrid" securities."' Perhaps it views these
tax related problems as uniquely suited to resolution by interparty
bargaining.
Of course, all the factors the Commission considers have effects
upon the price of the security. While one commentator has contended
that the apparent intent of the SEC is to have the bonds quoted at
or slightly above par," 5 there is little support for this position. At a
minimum, it can be said that the Commission will object to a sub-
stantial discount upon the bonds, particularly if the company intends
to retire the securities at that depressed price. While setting an appro-
priate interest rate is, of course, related to this, it is a subject that is
more related to the absolute priority rule.1 6 The rate of interest
must be compared to the yield of the securities exchanged to ensure
that the parties are made whole. If the interest rate is lowered, then
compensation must be made by adjusting the quality differences; for
instance, by increasing the allocation of securities made to that par-
ticular group. In general, first the interest rates will be set at levels
roughly comparable to the costs incurred by similar healthy com-
panies, and then the allocation will be determined. It remains to be
seen whether the SEC will use the current high interest rates as
guides, but it appears unlikely that the courts will want to brand the
debtor with debt bearing interest at greater than 15 percent.
D. Sinking Fund Provisions
It is important to grasp the statutory provisions dealing with sink-
ing funds. Section 216(9) of the Chandler Act provides that a plan:
may include, where any indebtedness is created or extended
under the plan for a period of more -than five years, provisions
for the retirement of such indebtedness by stated or determinable
payments out of a sinking fund or otherwise, (a) if secured,
within the expected useful life of the security therefor or (b) if
unsecured, or if the expected useful life of the security is not fairly
114. But cf. Inland Gas Corp., 38 S.E.C. 320, 355-56 (1958), where the SEC did
consider the nature of the recipient in determining the feasibility of the capital structure.
115. Calkins, Feasibility, supra note 4, at 770, citing McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,
8 S.E.C. 853 (1941).
116. See In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 954 (D.N.J. 1974);
Cf. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S.E.C. 174, 195 n.77 (1940); see generally Blum, supra
note 45.
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ascertainable, then within a specified reasonable time, not to exceed
forty years ..... 117
The legislative history expresses the concern that "there are in our
economic society two major forms of credit systems - long and short
terms; that the economic chaos which has come upon us has been
due in some measure -to unsound financing on long term credit" in
that "[b]ond issues have not provided adequate methods of amortiza-
tion." ' The suggestion is clearly that large bond issues should be
amortized over their life spans, yet the Bankruptcy Act provision for
amortization is entirely optional. This section was designed to en-
courage the gradual amortization of debt without requiring mandatory
sinking funds where none were necessary." 9
However, the SEC reads this statute differently; to them, a plan
is not feasible unless it provides that all indebtedness will be retired
by maturity,120 or by the time that the major income-producing assets
of the company are exhausted.12' The courts have not always agreed
with the SEC upon this matter.122 While the Commission has not
-established any fixed standard for sinking funds, it has approved the
retirement of a fixed amount of ,the bonds each year, and, as an alter-
native, the use of a fixed percentage of net earnings -to retire a portion
of the debt each year.123  It also appears to have approved provisions
117. 11 U.S.C. § 616(9) (1970) (emphasis added).
118. Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th
Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1937-1938). See also Hearings on H.R. 6439, Amended and
Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 142-43 (1937) ; Chandler, The Revised Bankruptcy Act of 1938, 24 A.B.A.J.
880, 883-84 (1938).
119. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 34-35 (1938) ; Hearings on H.R.
6439, Amended and Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 142-43 (1937); Gerdes, Section 77B, The Chandler
Bill and Other Proposed Revisions, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 361, 400-01 (1937). But see
Graham, supra note 39, at 146 (criticizing section 216(9) of the Chandler Act as
"needlessly inflexible").
120. See, e.g., Philadelphia & W. Ry., 13 S.E.C. 330, 336-38 (1943) (rejecting
a sinking fund that retired a yearly maximum of 2 percent of the face amount of a
30-year bond issue).
121. See, e.g., Broadway-Exchange Corp., 15 S.E.C. 256, 267-71 (1941); Boston
Met. Bldgs., Inc., 31 S.E.C. 854, at 872-75 (1950). See also Cenwest Corp., 15
S.E.C. 332, 360 (1944).
122. E.g., In re Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
123. Professor Calkins says the Commission prefers that 2% percent of the face
amount of the bonds be retired each year if the fixed sum method is used, and that
50 percent of net earnings after payment of bond interest and taxes be spent if the
fixed percentage method is used. Calkins, Feasibility, supra note 4, at 771. Cf. In re
Quaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F. Supp. 124, 128 (1947), suggesting a 50 percent
of earnings figure.
Under section 7(c) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15
U.S.C. § 79(1) (c) (1970), the SEC requires first mortgage bonds of issuers subject
to that Act to have an annual sinking fund equal to not less than 1 percent of the
aggregate principal amount of the bond issue. S.E.C. Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act Release No. 35-13105 (Feb. 16, 1965), 28
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for deferring the sinking fund payments if the installment would
deprive the company of sufficient working capital.' 24
In light of the optional nature of statutory sinking fund pro-
visions, and in view of the sharp disagreement as to who is the primary
beneficiary of a sinking fund,125 it is surprising that the SEC has
never explained the rationale of its policy of requiring them. Admit-
tedly, the SEC is supported by the fact that a substantial majority of
outstanding debt issues do have sinking funds,'12  but there are real
problems to which the SEC has not addressed itself. For example,
if the bonds or debentures are selling at a discount, then presumably
the corporation, or more accurately, the stockholders who hold the
equity in that corporation, are harmed and the bondholders benefited;
yet the SEC strenuously objects to any plan providing for the sys-
tematic purchase of debt upon the open market or by tender, pre-
sumably at a discount. The Commission takes this position: "The
expectation that bonds may be repurchased at a discount in itself
impels toward the conclusion that the plan is not feasible."' 27 The
other aspect of the problem is the result which obtains when the debt
sells at a premium."28 In -this situation it is the bondholders who are
hurt if their securities are redeemed at less than market value. This
can be cured by the use of a call premium, but the SEC has never
insisted upon one. Even then, it is not clear whether the call premium
would adequately compensate the bondholders. 2 9 Notice how this
issue interacts with the fairness question: fairness or feasibility re-
quires that a reorganization ticket be able to be sold at or near face
value either immediately or at a reasonable time after the reorgani-
zation is consummated. The SEC has not adequately responded to
124. Minnesota & Ont. Paper Co., 7 S.E.C. 456, 542 (1940).
125. Compare 1 A. DEWING, supra note 43, at 250-51, indicating that a sinking
fund's primary purpose is to protect the stockholders, with J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 276 (1968), arguing that "[tihe sinking fund works to
the disadvantage of common stockholders."
126. F. THOMPSON & R. NORGAARD, SINKING FUNDS: THEIR USE AND VALUE
31-39 (1967). The authors report that during the period 1965-1967, over 80 percent
of the publicly offered issues had sinking funds, and that in 1963, over 96 percent of
the private placements had them.
127. Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 196 (1945); accord, Broadway-Exchange
Corp., 15 S.E.C. 256 (1944) ("[lIt is highly objectionable to issue bonds containing
an express promise to pay a stated principal sum, when it is to be expected that the
bonds can be retired only at a very substantial discount." Id. at 270.) ; Boston Met.
Bldgs., Inc., 31 S.E.C. 854, 872-75 (1950). But cf. Greiss-Pfleger Tan. Co., 5 S.E.C.
72, 82 (1939), where the Commission indicated that while the ability to buy up
debentures at a significant discount was a plus in the feasibility question, it was a
minus as to the fairness issue.
128. This does happen; see note 208 infra.
129. Fraine & Mills, Effect of Defaults and Credit Deterioration on Yields on
Corporate Bonds, 16 J. FIN. 423 (1961) ("For the continuing investor, the call
premium is, in effect, inadequate 'Liquidated damages' for loss to be suffered on rein-
vestment." Id. at 427.)
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either of these questions, yet it continues to insist upon sinking funds.
Its policy reflects the belief that a company once in trouble may be there
again, unable to pay off or refinance the obligations at maturity.180
Thus the Commission implies that the firm is not competent to manage
its funds wisely, -and therefore requires it to join a "corporate Christ-
mas Club."'' A sinking fund also serves -to reinforce the clear
distinction between ownership and creditor interests that the SEC
prefers: securities should be pure, not hybrid, the debt portion being
only a temporary contribution to the firm's capital structure. 18 2
E. Convertible Securities and Warrants1 33
While the Commission has approved the use of convertible bonds,
it has avoided discussing them.' From the recipient's standpoint,
the convertible offers -the advantage of a "two-way play" :131 it allows
the bondholders to profit from a rise in value of the common stock
while simultaneously giving them some protection from adverse eco-
nomic conditions in the form of a fixed interest rate. In the typical
context, the investor pays for this advantage twice - paying a premium
for a conversion feature and a premium for a protective feature. 13 6
130. An investor with these fears will pay less for the same bond without a sinking
fund. Cf. Jen & Wert, Imputed Yields of a Sinking Fund Bond, and the Term
Structure of Interest Rates, 21 J. FIN. 698, 708 (1966). It has been suggested that
the sinking fund be viewed as a form of compensation to the bondholders. Guthman,
supra note 39, at 752. See also note 52 supra. However, it seems dubious that a
sinking fund can in any way affect the operation of the absolute priority rule.
131. Parks, Are Sinking Funds Obsolete?, 11 NEB. J. EcoN. & Bus. 54, 56 (1972).
132. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 43, at 239. Dewing concludes:
The increase in market price of corporation bonds by reason of the presence
of a sinking fund is one of the most interesting aspects of corporation finance,
because its causes are essentially psychological. The stockholder recognizes the
permanence of his investment, but the bondholder clings to the fiction that his
security must be redeemed in money by the corporation at a certain definite time.
He assumes that the bonded lien on the corporation's assets is but temporary
and that the stockholders look forward to the time when the corporation shall be
free from debt. The presence of the sinking fund covenant is evidence of the
conscious acknowledgment by the corporation of this presumption - and the
bondholder is willing to pay something for this acknowledgment.
Id.
133. Because they share common economic and financial attributes, convertible
securities and warrants are considered together, despite the fact that the SEC does
not consider them to be the same.
134. E.g., Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No.
313 (Aug. 29, 1973), 2 SEC Docket 377 (1973) ; Yale Exp. Sys., Inc., SEC Corporate
Reorganization Release No. 309, and SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No.
311 (March 23, 1972). The convertible bonds should have an antidilution provision.
Cf. Flour Mills of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1, 33 n.6 (1940).
135. Katzin, Financial and Legal Problems in the Use of Convertible Securities,
24 Bus. LAW. 359, 361 (1969). See generally J. PILCHER, RAISING CAPITAL. WITH
CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES (1955).
136. J. VAN HORNE, THE FUNCTION AND ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL MARKET RATES
167-69 (1970) ; Baumol, Malkiel & Quandt, The Valuation of Convertible Securities, 30
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This is reflected by the interest rate on convertibles, which is usually
below the rate that would be required for a straight debt security of the
same company. With less fixed charges, the use of convertibles, as
compared to an equivalent issue of nonconvertible bonds, reduces
the risk of ruin of the enterprise. While it seems that holders of the
common stock should benefit by this reduced risk, they actually face
the prospect of having their equities diluted. Even so, the convertible
security can be viewed as beneficially delaying and reducing this dilu-
tion of the common stock. 3 7
Alternatively, it has been argued that conversion is most likely
to occur when the conversion price is materially below the price at
which the corporation could issue stock and when it may not need the
money.' " In the reorganization context, the convertible debenture
faces many of the same objections as a warrant. First, are the senior
security holders "made whole" by the underlying debenture, and if
they are, what is the need for the convertibility option? If the seniors
are not made whole by the underlying debenture, and the convertibility
feature is part of their compensation package, is this scheme fair to
the new junior who will bear the downside risk of the enterprise while
having any upside gains diluted by conversion? The SEC has focused
upon -these issues in its treatment of warrants.' 39
Warrants may be issued separately or in conjunction with an-
other security, usually with preferred stock or debt. Where issued
with a debt security, the warrant may be detachable from the under-
lying security, or may only be transferable with -the security attached.
In either case, the principal distinction between warrants and con-
80 QUART. J. ECON. 48 (1966); Brigham, An Analysis of Convertible Debentures:
Theory and Some Empirical Evidence, 21 J. FIN. 35 (1966).
137. Katzin, supra note 135, at 361.
138. E.g., Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121, citing BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 200-01 (1934). Cf. SEC Securities Act Release
No. 33-4936 at § 36 (Dec. 9, 1968), which is quoted from at note 144 infra.
139. The Commission argued that the use of warrants was unfair where a pro-
posed plan satisfied $12 million worth of claims with the following package of
securities: (1) convertibles worth $1.5 million, (2) 85 percent of the common stock,
worth $9 million, and (3) warrants worth $1.5 million. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc.,
SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 313 (Aug. 29, 1973), 2 SEC Docket 377,
385 (1973). The SEC first objected to the use of warrants in a Chapter X proceed-
ing, contending that a warrant was neither an appropriate instrument to impose
upon a debtor undergoing reorganization, nor an acceptable currency for paying off
creditors of the debtor. Id. The Commission declared:
[I]f the plan is interpreted as intending to satisfy, in full, the claims of creditors
and preferred stockholders in conventional securities (debentures and stocks),
with the warrants added as a bonus to creditors, the plan would be grossly unfair
to the common stockholders . . . . [The common stockholders are] entitled to
protection against invasion by senior claims and interests. A bonus to creditors
would be at the expense of the stockholders and would violate their rights.
Id. at 385 (footnotes omitted). It should be noted that in reviewing the same plan,
the Commission did not object to a convertibility feature on the debentures.
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vertible debt instruments is that the warrant results in a cash con-
tribution to the enterprise when the option is exercised. For example,
there is little difference between a convertible debenture worth $100
which is convertible into ten shares of stock, and the same noncon-
vertible security with an attached warrant to purchase ten shares of
stock at $10 per share, ,regardless of whether such shares can be sepa-
rated. However, the Commission has treated the feasibility of includ-
ing warrants in the proposed capital structure as a subject uniquely
deserving of direct comment. To the SEC warrants are "inherently
deceptive" and that is as true today140 as it was in 1939.'
It is instructive to catalog the SEC's objections to the use of
warrants. The first objection is a contention that there is a statutory
mandate against warrants. The Commission has argued that war-
rants may violate the statutory policy of section 216(12) (a) of the
Chandler Act prohibiting nonvoting stock, and the mandate of sec-
tion 216(12)(b) which requires that the charter of the reorganized
enterprise contain provisions which are "fair and equitable and in
accordance with sound business and accounting practice, with respect
to the terms, position, rights and privileges of the several classes of
securities of the debtor. ...""' However, this argument appears to
be weak'43 and the SEC has not used it to any great extent.
140. Id. at 385. The Commission concluded:
A warrant . . . is a highly speculative security. It does not give its holder
any present interest in the reorganized company. It has no voting power or any
right to participate in dividends or earnings. The value of the warrant depends
predominantly on market factors and is particularly sensitive to market fluctua-
tions in the underlying security.
In Chapter X a warrant is not an appropriate instrument to impose upon a
debtor undergoing reorganization. Nor are the warrants an acceptable currency
for the purchase of a company in reorganization. Accordingly, creditors of . ..
[the debtor] cannot be required to surrender . . . claims . . . in exchange for
such an instrument.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See Niagara Hudson Corp. v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336,
346-47 (1951), for a discussion of the use of warrants in the context of a reorganization
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
141. See Detroit Int'l Bridge Co., 4 S.E.C. 682, 688 (1939). See also Flour Mills
of America, Inc., 7 S.E.C. 1, 25-26 (1940).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12)(b) (1970). For the Commission's application of this
section to warrants, see Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121 n.29 (1946).
Note that section 77(b) (3) of the Bankruptcy Act specifically provides that
a reorganization plan for a railroad corporation "may include, for the purpose of pre-
serving such interests of creditors and stockholders as are not otherwise provided for,
provisions for the issuance to any such creditor or stockholder of options or warrants
to receive, or to subscribe for, securities of the reorganized company in such amounts
and upon such terms and conditions as may be set forth in the plan." 11 U.S.C. §
205(b) (3) (1970). This provision is merely permissive and not "mandatory," and
the creditors and stockholders in question must have some equity before being allowed
to participate in the reorganization. See Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 448,
476 (1943). See also 10 REMINGTON ON BANKRUPTCY § 4244 (1947).
143. See notes 193-98 and accompanying text infra for a description of the motive
behind Section 216(12) and its relationship to feasibility.
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The SEC's second objection is that
[1]ong-term option warrants are unsound from the standpoint
of the company. They are not likely to be exercised at a time
when the company has an urgent need for capital, but when the
company needs it least. In fact, the obligation of the company
under a long-term contract to sell shares of its common stock
at stated prices at the option of the prospective purchasers may
constitute an impediment to further equity financing.144
The Commission is saying three things in this passage. First, the
warrant will be exercised when the exercise price is much less than
the price at which the corporation could issue common stock. Second,
it will be exercised when the corporation does not need 'the money.'45
Third, the outstanding warrants act as a brake upon the upward price
movement of the common stock. However, in the reorganization con-
text these arguments are muted, as the SEC is seeking to impose low
debt capital structures upon companies which will most often have
limited growth prospects either because of a general decline in the in-
dustry or from the stigma of bankruptcy. Even with an optimistic
outlook, returning to the equity markets is indeed an extremely long
range alternative for these debtors.
144. Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121 (1946) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
This should be compared to the SEC's requirements with respect to the disclosure
of the effect of outstanding warrants in a registration statement under the Securities
Act of 1933:
If a material amount of options or warrants has been or is to be issued to pro-
moters, underwriters, finders, principal stockholders, officers or directors, certain
disclosure in regard thereto should be made in the prospectus . . . . Such addi-
tional disclosure should ordinarily include the following: that for the life of the
options or warrants the holders thereof are given, at nominal cost, the oppor-
tunity to profit from a rise in the market for securities of the class subject thereto,
with a resulting dilution in the interest of security holders; that the terms on
which the issuer could obtain additional capital during that period may be
adversely affected; and that the holders of such options or warrants might be
expected to exercise them at a time when the issuer would, in all likelihood, be
able to obtain any needed capital by a new offering of securities on terms more
favorable than those provided for by the options or warrants. Similar disclosure
should also be made where securities with conversion privileges are issued to
the above persons.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 33-4936 (Dec. 9, 1968).
145. With convertible debentures, the/Company has more flexibility as to the time
of exercise. By calling the debentures at any time when conversion is profitable, the
company can force the holders to convert or sell their debentures back to the company
at a price that is often less than the current market value. This is, of course, unlikely
to occur when the convertible securities are held by controlling persons or by those
tied with management; the SEC's actions with respect to Securities Act registration
statements recognize this. See note 144 supra.
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The SEC has also developed a third objection:
[L]ong-term option warrants are also objectionable from
the standpoint of the public interest. Since they constitute merely
a call on common stock they are likely to be subject to extra-
ordinarily wide fluctuations on the market. Their extreme market
instability is no doubt increased by the difficulty of determining
their value.146
With this objection the Commission is fulfilling its role as the
guardian of the securities markets. Conditions have changed since
the SEC first stated these objections in 1946. The financial com-
munity has achieved a greater level of sophistication in valuing war-
rants and a fuller understanding of their market behavior. At the
same time, the merger movement of the 1960's brought a greater
awareness to the investing public of the nature of warrants and related
convertible bonds. In 1946, the Commission stated that, "[i]t is
significant that the New York Stock Exchange has refused in recent
years to admit long-term warrants to trading and at the present time
none are listed on the Exchange."' 47  This policy was altered in
1970,148 and by the end of 1972, 12 issues of warrants, representing.
11 issuers, were listed upon the Exchange and generated a volume
of 53.5 million warrants per year. 149 Yet the SEC remains fast in its
position that the warrant is too speculative a security to merit its
approval, and refuses to consider it an acceptable form of cornpensa-
146. Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 121 (1946) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 122.
148. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § All (1968) (Rights to
Subscribe) ; id. § B6, at B124-25 (1971) (Standards of Eligibility for Listing Long
Term Warrants). The Exchange concludes:
Warrants must be to purchase the common stock of the issuing company,
which stock is currently, or will be concurrent with the warrant, listed on the
NYSE. Each warrant shall represent the right to buy at least one share of
common stock, with the warrant holder not entitled to any privileges of the holder
of common stock including dividends, pre-emptive rights or voting rights.
[T]he Exchange can, where circumstances warrant, take into con-
sideration . . . factors which could have a bearing on the warrant holder's
ultimate expectation of exercising his warrant ....
The aggregate of shares purchasable upon exercise of the warrants being
considered for listing shall not exceed 20% of the total common stock out-
standing of the issuing company at the time of the issuance of such warrants,
unless shareholder approval of the issuance is obtained. However, the Exchange
will not list warrants where the total outstanding would represent more than
50% of the common stock outstanding . ...
Id.
149. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, FACT BOOK 18 (1973). As of March 31,
1974, 12 companies had 13 issues of warrants, totaling 65 million warrants in all,
listed on the exchange. They were worth $311 million. New York Stock Exchange,
Stocks and Warrants Listed on the N.Y.S.E. (April 4, 1974).
1974-1975]
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tion. The sum and substance of the above three complaints of the SEC
is that the warrants are not suitable as reorganization tickets. 50
However, principal discussion of warrants has shifted to a murky
fourth objection where feasibility and fairness meet - the argument
that warrants are not feasible because they are not fair. Warrants
can be given to two groups of people, those who are "made whole" in
the reorganization process and those who are granted only a limited
participation in the reorganized entity. With respect to the former,
the Commission's argument is simple: a creditor cannot be made
whole with warrants because warrants are not suitable, as reorgani-
zation tickets, as previously discussed; and if the creditor is made
whole without the warrants, it is unfair to the other participants to
give him warrants.' In the latter arena, where creditors or stock-
holders who are faced with the prospect of not being awarded any
participation at all in the new enterprise try to claim a minimal par-
ticipation in the form of warrants," 2 the SEC faces additional prob-
lems. Warrants here can be viewed as protection for the marginal
participants from an erroneous low valuation of the enterprise. 53
Issuing warrants to these individuals will cost the enterprise nothing
if the valuation is correct and the warrants expire. However, if the
valuation is too low, the price of the common stock will rise and the
warrants will be exercised, thus giving these people the share of the
enterprise -they should have received when the company was reor-
ganized. Furthermore, the cash received from the exercise of the
warrants can be used to retire the debt issued at the reorganization,
thus returning more of the enterprise to its original owners or junior
150. See 14 U. CH1. L. REV. 84, 92 (1946) (warrants do not meet a "reasonable
investment standard"); note 140 and accompanying text supra.
151. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 313
(Aug. 29, 1973), 2 SEC Docket 377, 385 (1973), quoted at note 139 supra.
152. Spitzer v. Stichman, 278 F.2d 402, 405-06 (2d Cir. 1960) ; Central States
Elec. Corp., 30 S.E.C. 680, 729 (1949). But cf. Ecker v. Western Pac. R.R., 318 U.S.
448, 476 (1943) ("valueless" warrants might be permitted) (dictum).
153. The Proposed Act represents the most recent expression of this "second
chance" idea. Section 7-303(3) provides that a plan of reorganization may include,
if the plan is based on an estimated valuation which would preclude other par-
ticipation by any class . . . provisions for delayed participation rights . . . con-
ditioned on the court's determination within a period specified in the plan but
not later than five years from the date of confirmation that the reorganized debtor
or the successor under the plan has attained a financial status that warrants
such participation.
II BANKRUPTCY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 241. Rather than specifically
authorizing warrants, this section appears to allow the valuation of the debtor to
"float" within a period to be examined later. Blum & Kaplan, Absolute Priority,
supra note 39, at 674. See generally Rochelle & Balzersen, Recomnendations for
Amendments to Chapter X, 46 Am. BANKR. L.J. 93, 99-102 (1972). Yet the drafters
of the Proposed Act rejected the suggestion that these rights be made nontransfer-
able, thus leaving the path open for the issuing of warrants. II BANKRUPTCY COM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 262 n.39.
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creditors. 54 The unfairness of this idea is clear: creditors have been
forced to take a riskier ticket - straight equity - at the reorgani-
zation. It is unfair to subject these people to the downside risk of
receiving no dividends while diluting their chance of upside benefits
from appreciation in value of the enterprise. 5 -
Provisions for management stock options raise similar problems.
While they are primarily designed to serve as employment compen-
sation, and are therefore tailored to both personnel objectives and to
income tax considerations, options can have the same equity-diluting
effect upon the corporation's capital structure. Note, however, that
to the extent they replace fixed charges for salary with the contiugent
dividend expense upon the underlying stock, the options can actually
reduce the risk of ruin of the enterprise. The SEC has not yet re-
sponded to this argument.
It is clear 'that management cannot "contribute" its services in
exchange for a portion of the reorganized enterprise. The Supreme
Court of the United States in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
Co.' specifically held that the strategic value that management may
possess - the ability to control the enterprise and hinder the reor-
ganization process - is not to be regarded as a thing of value which
can be relinquished in exchange for a participation in the new enter-
prise.' 57 However, options are not sought to be included upon that
theory; rather, they are viewed by their proponents simply as incen-
tives for employees. The reorganization contest is viewed as a par-
ticularly appropriate time to make provisions for the employees, as
the corporation is making a fresh start.
The SEC views the employee stock option with the same dis-
favor with which it views warrants.' In Selected Investments Trust
154. Guthman, supra note 41, at 752; Calkins, Corporate Reorganization Under
Chapter X: A Post-Mortem, 3 J. FIN. 19, 27 (1948) (both advocating the use
of warrants).
155. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 598.
156. 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
157. Id. at 122. But cf. Horowitz v. Kaplan, 193 F.2d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 1951),
aff'g In re Waltham Watch Co., 97 F. Supp. 189 (D. Mass.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
946 (1952), where the court approved a plan which gave large stock options to a
manager, not previously a stockholder, whose services were essential to the corpora-
tion. Id. The court distinguished Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S.
426 (1932), upon the basis that in Case the plan had not had any binding employment
agreement and the options had not been limited to managers. 97 F. Supp. at 73-75.
See text accompanying note 55 supra. Section 7-303(4) of the Proposed Act would
adopt the district court opinion reversed in Case and allow the participation by man-
agement which is not presently permitted under the absolute priority rule. II
BANKRUPTCY Co mIssIoN REPORT, supra note 4, at 254.
158. In fact, there is evidence indicating that the Commission has confused the
two. See Imperial "400", Inc., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 313
(Aug. 29, 1973), 2 SEC DOCKET 377, 393 n.26, citing Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85,
120-22 (1946) (dealing with long-term warrants) and Selected Invs. Trust Fund, 36
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Fund,"9 the SEC evaluated a plan which provided for management
stock options. In rejecting the plan, it stated:
The proposal for [stock options] raises substantial questions of
policy as well as fairness.
Stock options, whatever their propriety and appeal as in-
centives to good management for solvent and proven enterprises,
do not appear appropriate for inclusion in a plan of reorganiza-
tion on the eve of an insolvent Debtor's financial rehabilitation.
At their best, they represent a long-range forecast as to untried
management's capabilities to realize sanguine expectations. At
their worst, they are media for speculation and sources of dilution
of increments in value which should first be applied for the benefit
of investors, especially those who have suffered from financial
reverses of the enterprise. 6 °
However, the Commission at the same time appeared to leave open
the possibility of continued vitality for stock options by suggesting
specific modifications of the option plan.' 6'
The same problem was confronted a decade later in the reorgani-
zation of the Westec Corporation. 62 The Commission initially re-
jected a plan providing for stock options, 6 3 but the trustee modified
the plan, following the hints the SEC had suggested 10 years earlier
in Selected Investments. In a supplemental report, the Commission
gave a guarded approval while in effect declaring that it was not
actually approving anything because the stockholders were merely
being informed that they would be asked to vote upon the stock
option plan in the future.' With that accomplished, the SEC aban-
doned the embarrassing position of arguing that a procedure followed
39 S.E.C. 37, 55-56 (1959) (dealing with management stock options). Much of the
discussion in Selected Investments also gives the impression of confusion, although the
plan there involved a complex hybrid of warrants and incentive options.
159. 39 S.E.C. 37 (1959).
160. Id. at 55-56.
161. Id. at 57-58,
162. Westec Corp., 43 S.E.C. 1015 (1969).
163. Id. at 1029-30.
164. Westec Corp., 43 S.E.C. 1089, 1089-90 (1969). The Commission concluded:
The amended plan is consistent with the views we expressed in our original
advisory report, since the definitive stockholder vote will take place after a specific
stock option plan has been adopted by the board of directors and disclosed to the
stockholders. In this context, the reference to stock options in the plan of
reorganization in effect is only advance disclosure of future intent, which does
not affect the independent decision of stockholders to approve or disapprove the
stock option plan when presented to them.
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by most of our country's larger corporations was not feasible because
of unfair dilution of stockholders' equity.165
In summary, it is clear that convertible bonds, long-term war-
rants, and stock options have not received similar treatment by the
SEC. The warrant differs from the convertible bond in that cash
rather than the senior security must be contributed to the enterprise
when it is exercised, yet the dilution and valuation problems remain.166
165. The SEC has recognized the need to attract management and has approved
the use of stock option for companies subject to the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935. Middle South Util., Inc., 40 S.E.C. 509 (1961). However, it has re-
fused to allow options to be issued to employees of registered investment companies.
State Bond & Mtge. Co., SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4685 (Aug.
25, 1966).
166. It is interesting to note that while the Childs Co. reorganization was still
pending before the Commission (the final report was not issued until August 13,
1947), the SEC faced the issue of the acceptability of convertible debentures in the
capital structures of companies subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935, and chose to openly discuss the valuation and dilution problems. Public
Serv. Co., 26 S.E.C. 338, 350-52 (1947). The Commission stated:
A convertible debenture combines the investment features of a debenture
with the speculative aspects of a long term option warrant to obtain stock at a
fixed price. So long as the market value of the stock is close to the conversion
price, the price of the debentures will be determined by the investment value of
the debentures qua debentures plus whatever value is attributed to the option
to purchase stock at that price in the future. If, however, the market price of
the stock rises above the conversion price, the price of the debenture will fluctuate
with the value of the stock. Should the price of the stock become very high and
raise the price of the debenture proportionately, the latter will lose all of the
stability normally associated with a debenture and because of the low yield the
holder will be interested in retaining it only as a convenient means of speculating
in the stock into which the debenture is convertible. The fact that the deben-
ture gradually loses its investment quality and takes on the speculative charac-
teristics of common stock may frequently confuse and delude the investor.
Furthermore, the conversion feature, being essentially an option to obtain
common stock, is an interest that has been carved out of the common stockholders'
equity. As such, it represents a potential share in both the company's surplus
and future earnings, a fact often overlooked or misunderstood by investors in
the appraisal of common stock values. The value of the conversion privilege is,
therefore, based on the opportunity to share in the profits of the company, with-
out the normal risks of ownership, by obtaining the stock at a lower price than
the value of the stock equity at the time of conversion. In the instant case, the
conversion price has been fixed at $40, approximately the current market value
of the stock. Conversions effected when the market price of the stock has risen
above that price not only require the company to issue stock at a lower price
than would be obtained through a public offering but result in a dilution of the
equity of existing stockholders. Because of the difficulty in predicting future
market fluctuations and measuring the amount of that dilution, it is unlikely that
stockholders will be adequately compensated for this dilution in the price they
can obtain either for the warrants they acquire or for the debentures, if they are
sold before the market price of the common stock has risen. In addition, the
possibility that additional shares equal to 25 percent of the total shares now
outstanding may be issued under the conversion option makes it extremely difficult
to appraise the stock on the basis of its present earning power and a statement
regarding its earnings per share may frequently mislead an unwary investor.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Yet the Commission approved the debentures, requiring only
that the conversion period be shortened from 12 years to a little over 4 years, with
the idea that the conversion feature should not be outstanding when the company
would most likely have to go to the capital market again. 38
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Probing the Commission's collective psyche is not easy; however, it
is suggested that the SEC believes the following:
(1) A warrant is not the conservative, "pure" security that a
convertible debenture is; it is the security that the aggressive
companies try to sell to the speculator. Even the New York
Stock Exchange refused to list warrants for years. Conserva-
tive financial policy thus dictates the elimination of warrants.
(2) The conversion of a debt instrument into a contingent charge
security decreases the risk of ruin -of a company although
that risk may be more theoretical than real as the very act
of conversion is a sign of prosperity rather than adversity.
The same effect might be had if, upon the exercise of any
outstanding warrants, the company used the money received
to retire some of its debt. But a company in reorganization
cannot be trusted to do this.
(3) Warrants are challenges to !the SEC's ability to value the
debtor correctly and its capacity to inject a note of finality
into the reorganization proceeding.1"7  When a convertible
debenture is converted, the security holder is merely exchang-
ing his -tickets for different ones. Moreover, this often occurs
at a time chosen by management. Warrants, however, are
merely slips of hope given away with the idea that eventually
they might be worth something. Until they blossom or are
expired, the reorganization, at least psychologically, can
never come to an end.
As far as management 'stock options are concerned, the Commis-
sion now realizes its lack of control over the situation. The real de-
mand for this sort of compensation comes from modern executives.
The SEC, in line with its policy of ensuring that the debtor has com-
petent management and is able to attract competent executives from
outside the company with no conflicts of interest, has relaxed its
standards in this area.
F. Preferred Stock
The feasibility requirements for preferred stock often closely re-
semble those for debt obligation, even to the extent of requiring a
sinking fund in some cases.' However, as noted previously," 9 the
167. See Blum & Kaplan, supra note 39, where the authors state:
The essence of a bankruptcy reorganization, which binds all parties whether or
not they accept the plan, involves imposing on them some kind of principled,
disciplined conclusion as to value in the face of inescapable uncertainty. And a
conclusion without an end is no conclusion.
Id. at 679.
168. See, e.g., Childs Co., 24 S.E.C. 85, 122 (1946); Sayre & Fisher Brick Co.,
10 S.E.C. 64, 74-76 (1941).
169. See note 71 and notes 113 & 114 and accompanying texts supra.
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Commission carefully avoids any comparative analysis of the respective
tax consequences of preferred stock as opposed to debt, for either the
reorganized debtor or the recipient.
The SEC requires that the description upon the certificates be
accurate, and will not tolerate the use of the label "stock" when the
underlying obligation to the recipient is actually an interest in a con-
templated liquidation.' Although there is much flexibility, in that a
wide variety of terms for the proposed preferred stock are acceptable,
there must be an actual intention coupled with an apparent ability to
pay dividends in cash, and not stock, or the security will be viewed as
deceptive.'- This treatment is in direct contrast with SEC's tacit
acceptance of the fact that dividends on the common stock will often
be nonexistent or nominal in the years immediately following reorgan-
ization. Evidently, preferred dividends may be cumulative, noncumu-
lative, 17 2 or participating, depending upon the nature of the reorganized
debtor, but it must be reiterated that the Commission does not look
favorably upon complex, hybrid securities. 7 ' The SEC generally does
not find inherently objectionable provisions which restrict or postpone
payment of preferred stock dividends where such restriction or post-
ponement is not due to prospective inability to pay, but instead is part
of an express or implied, predetermined policy to retire debt as ex-
peditiously as possible.' 74  This is in accord with the Commission's
belief that the less debt the corporation bears, the less the risk of a
forced liquidation or second reorganization, arid this, quite naturally,
is a paramount requirement for reorganized debtors. On the other
hand, the SEC will not approve the plan if excessive arrearages, which
cannot foreseeably be paid by the reorganized debtor will result. 7'
170. See Parkwood, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1067, 1078 (1969).
171. Compare La France Indus., 5 S.E.C. 917, 932--33 (1939) (fact that cash
dividends on preferred stock will not be paid for several years following reorganiza-
tion indicates frailty of plan so as to be unfeasible), with Jade Oil & Gas Co., SEC
Corporate Reorganization Release No. 289 (Sept. 15, 1969) (provisions in plan
calling for stock dividends where it was clear that no cash dividends were contem-
plated or possibly found to be unfair but not infeasible). See note 71 supra.
172. See, e.g., Jade Oil & Gas Co., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No.
289 (Sept. 15, 1969), where the Commission stated that "[t]he cumulative feature
of the proposed Series A is inappropriate in the case of an enterprise, like reorganized
Jade, which will be promotional and speculative in character and oriented to the hope
of capital gains rather than to dividend income."
173. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
174. See Atlas Pipe. Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 420 (1941); Higbee Co., 8 S.E.C. 777,
796-97 (1941).
175. Higbee Co., 8 S.E.C. 777, 796-97 & n.29 (1941); San Francisco Bay Toll-
Bridge Co., 6 S.E.C. 863, 871-72 (1939); La France Indus., 5 S.E.C. 917, 932-33(1939). In Higbee, the SEC observed:
Normally a plan could not be considered feasible which contemplated the accumu-
lation of unpaid dividends on the preferred stock for a maximum period of 10
years, and a minimum period of nearly 5 years if present earnings are maintained. 40
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Voting powers must be granted to the preferred stock in accord-
ance with the section 216(12) (a) prohibition against provisions in the
plan for nonvoting stock, but the exact nature of this right to vote may
vary.1 76  The proposed preferred shareholders must also be granted
preemptive rights, 7 7 and, in appropriate cases, it may also be required
that there be a protective ban upon any extraordinary borrowing by
the reorganized debtor without at least their two-thirds approval. 78
Finally, the Commission has read the last phrase of section 216(12) (a)
to require that the proposed preferred shareholders gain voting control




As a general proposition, the SEC approves and encourages the
inclusion of large amounts of common stock in a plan, yet this has not
stopped the SEC from examining the nature of the stock proposed to
be issued. The Commission often must evaluate a Chapter X plan of
slow liquidation which calls for the issuance of stock18 0 or participation
certificates.' ' In some instances, where the possibility of deception is
especially acute, the SEC has required that these be labeled "liquidation
certificates," in order to fully inform the new holders of such interests
of their true nature.' 2 Recently, the SEC has carried the distinction
between a proposed liquidating company and a proposed going concern
one step further than the mere relabeling of the participation tickets.
As we have said, however, in this case the dividend accumulations will not result
from an inability of the company to earn the dividends, and if earnings continue
at the present level the funded debt should be fully paid off in about 5 years and
all arrears and current dividends in the following year.
Higbee Co., supra at 796 n.29.
176. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12) (a) (1970). For an illustration of the various ways in
which voting rights of preferred stock within proposed reorganization plans may
differ, see Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 362, 362-63 (1947) (cumulative voting with 12 votes
per share) ; Penn Timber Co., 17 S.E.C. 107, 110 (1944) (cumulative voting with one
vote per share, one class of stock having the contingent right to be the sole voting
stock) ; Sayre & Fisher Brick Co., 10 S.E.C. 64, 67 (1941) (cumulative voting with
four votes per share, and sole contingent voting rights upon dividend default) ; Higbee
Co., 8 S.E.C. 777, 781 (voting within class to elect three of seven directors).
177. See, e.g., Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 362, 367 (1947).
178. See Childs Co., 26 S.E.C. 511, 512 (1947).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12) (a) (1970). This phrase mandates "adequate provisions
for the election of directors representing such preferred class in the event of default
in the payment of cash dividends." Id. See Higbee Co., 8 S.E.C. 777, 797-98, 800
(1941) (proposed preferred shareholders gain voting control upon the failure to pay
six quarterly dividends).
180. See, e.g., Parkwood, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1067, 1078-79 (1969) (preferred stock);
Mortgage Guar. Co., 8 S.E.C. 499, 507 (1941) (common stock); Reynolds Inv. Co.,
6 S.E.C. 699, 709 (1940) (preferred and common stock).
181. Silesian-American Corp., 31 S.E.C. 1, 74-75 (1950).
182. See Parkwood, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1067, 1078 (1969); Reynolds Inv. Co., Inc.,
6 S.E.C. 699, 709 (1940).
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They have disapproved any recapitalization and attendant issuance of
certificates at all where the reorganized debtor is designed eventually to
liquidate.18 3  Moreover, with respect to the deception by mislabeling
issue, the SEC views as deceptive a plan which-provides for the issu-
ance of common stock where there is clearly no chance of dividends
being paid upon the stock.18 The emphasis must be upon "clearly" as
the rationale behind the Commission's insistence on common stock
financing is the permissive nature of dividend payment. Thus it appears
as long as payment of at least a nominal dividend on common can be
projected, the SEC will be satisfied. Conversely, when dealing with
reorganization of public utilities, the need for a continuous dividend
stream to attract investors is vital to the utility's health, and accordingly
the certainty of dividends upon common stock must be much greater.'85
Approved plans have also required that dividends upon common stock
only be paid out of surplus accumulated after the date of the reorganiza-
tion, or only so as not to impair capital.;' but, on the other hand,
dividends may not be unreasonably restricted.8 7 Additionally, in cer-
tain instances the Commission will object to the proposed creation of
an excessively large balance sheet capital surplus from which dividends
may be declared as part of the reorganization plan.' 8
While the absolute number of shares to be issued pursuant to
recapitalization is usually within the discretion of: the proponent of
the plan, the SEC has objected to an excessive number of low-priced
183. Parkwood, Inc., 43 S.E.C. 1067, 1079 (i969) (where trade creditors were
to receive under the plan certificates! of ,partkcipation, the SEC recommended that
they receive nontransferable certificates or that no certificates be issued at all and a
list of participants be filed with the court instead) ; Bevis Shell Homes, Inc., 41 S.E.C.
982, 990 (1964).
184. Cf. La France Indus., 5 S.E.C. 917, 932-33 (1939).
185. Cf. Inland Gas Corp., 38 S.E.C. 320, 355-56 (1958) (reorganization plan for
public utility approved as feasible despite prospective inability to pay dividends on
common stock as the common stock was to be distributed to a consenting private
holding company and not to the public).
186. Third Ave. Transit Corp., 37 S.E.C. 113, 156 (1956) (post reorganization
surplus) ; Higbee Co., 8 S.E.C. 777, 798 (1941) (impair capital surplus).
187. F.L. Jacobs Co., 42 S.E.C. 979 (1966). The reorganization plan in Jacobs
proposed an issue of 15-year debentures whose indenture required that 40 percent of
the company's annual net income be deposited in a sinking fund for retirement of the
debt. It further required that no dividends be paid upon the common stock until one-
half of the principal amount of the debentures had been redeemed or otherwise retired,
or a $1 million bank loan, taken out to consummate the plan, had been paid in full,
whichever occurred first. The SEC concluded that the plan was feasible and that it
would be fair and equitable if it were amended to remove the dividend restriction.
Id. at 987-88. It is interesting to note the Commission's logic: the plan was unfair
precisely because it was feasible without the dividend restriction. The SEC's report
pointed to adequate earnings coverage, sufficient working capital on hand, a positive
cash flow, and the fact that the bank's loan was well secured. The Commission con-
cluded that there was no need for the restriction which rendered the plan unfair. Id.
188. Inland Gas Corp., 30 S.E.C. 59, 61 (1949). 42
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shares.'5 9 It should be noted that although there generally is an
optimum price for shares of common stock due to the round-lot pur-
chase system and the strange collective psyche of investors, 9" the
Commission has made no apparent attempt to influence the price of
the common stock of the reorganized debtor such that it approximates
this optimum.
The issue of the distribution of voting control is concerned more
with fairness than with feasibility.' Quite obviously, to the extent
that feasibility demands that a creditor take an equity position in the
reorganized enterprise, fairness dictates that along with the new risks
assumed he be given a pro rata allocation of voting power.'92 In the
distribution of rights and privileges among the reorganization tickets,
section 216(12) is the court's guide; it mandates that the reorganized
debtor's charter include:
(a) provisions prohibiting the debtor or such corporation
from issuing non-voting stock, and providing, as to the several
classes of securities of the debtor or of such corporation possessing
voting power, for the fair and equitable distribution of such power
among such classes, including, in the case of any class of stock
having a preference over other stock with respect to dividends,
adequate provisions for the election of directors representing such
preferred class in the event of default in the payment of such
dividends; and
(b) (1) provisions which are fair and equitable and in
accordance with sound business and accounting practice, with re-
spect to the terms, position, rights, and privileges of the several
classes of securities of the debtor or of such corporation, including,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, provisions with
189. See In re Phoenix Gems, Inc., Civil No. B-21072 (D. Ariz., filed Dec. 23,
1971), discussed in 38 SEC ANN. REP. 123-24 (1972) (SEC recommended that plan
be amended to reduce proposed 18 million shares to 1.8 million shares); Jade Oil &
Gas Co., SEC Corporate Reorganization Release No. 289 (Sept. 15, 1969) (SEC
objected to proposed issuance of 8 million shares of common stock of a highly
speculative oil venture as it would magnify the volatility of the issue and recom-
mended instead issuing 250,000 shares).
190. The most favorable price range for stocks listed with the New York Stock
Exchange is $18-25. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A14, at
A-255 (Aug. 15, 1955). However, there is also a requirement for listing a minimum
of 1 million shares. Id. § B1, at B-3 (Jan. 5, 1970).
191. See generally 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, ff 10.21; Krotinger, Management
and Allocation of Voting Power in Corporate Reorganizations, 41 COLUm. L. REv.
646 (1941).
192. The Commission has stated:
Fairness of reorganization plans should be considered not only in light of the
allocation of assets and earnings among the various claimants but also in light of
the allocation of control. Control in these cases is an important and valuable
emolument. It should rest in the hands of those who show promise of exercising
it as a power in trust. Courts should be as solicitous in this regard as they are
in determining priorities as respects assets and earnings.
PROTECTIVE CoMm. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. I, at 903.
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respect to the issuance, acquisition, purchase, retirement or re-
demption of any such securities, and the declaration and payment
of dividends thereon; and (2) in the case of a debtor whose in-
debtedness, liquidated as to amount and not contingent as to
liability, is $250,000 or over, provisions with respect to the making,
not less than once annually, of periodic reports to security holders
which shall include profit and loss statements and balance sheets
prepared in accordance with sound business and accounting prac-
tice .... 193
The requirements are clearly mandatory,'94 and were inserted by
the Senate'95 in an attempt to incorporate some of the features of the
proposed Borah-O'Mahoney Federal Licensing Bill.'96 The intent seems
clear: while the control of the court over the debtor ends upon con-
summation of the plan, this provision is designed to insure a continuing
degree of federal influence over the capital structure and corporate prac-
tices of the reorganized enterprise.'97 By institutionalizing protective
mechanisms via the corporate charter, the reforms that the reorganiza-
tion process brought to the enterprise can be perpetrated beyond the
time when direct judicial supervision ceases. 98
193. 11 U.S.C. § 616(12)(a)-(b) (1970).
194. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938).
195. Id. at 7.
196. S. 3072, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). See Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1937-38); Heuston,
Corporate Reorganizations Under the Chandler Act, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1199, at
1213-14 (1938) ; Krotinger, supra note 191, at 644 & n.86. Upon the concept of federal
licensing, see generally 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 107-11 (2d ed. 1961);
H. REUSCHLEIN, THE SCHOOLS OF CORPORATE REFORM (1950). Note that the SEC
also considered the alternative of federal corporate licensing in 1938 as a solution to
the problem of over-aggressive charter soliciting upon the part of certain states "whose
objective in regulating corporations is revenue, rather than the protection of security
holders." PROTECTIVE Co IM. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. VII, at 412-13.
197. The SEC has recognized the importance of this control device:
The Commission also gives its attention to the drafting and preparation of
corporate charters, bylaws, trust indentures, and other instruments which are to
govern the internal structure of the reorganized debtor. The Commission strives
to obtain the inclusion of various provisions in these instruments which will
assure to the investors a maximum of protection, adequate information with
regard to the enterprise, and a fair voice in the management.
14 SEC ANN. REP. 90 (1944).
198. The SEC recognized this idea:
Another aspect of fairness, and of feasibility ...relates to the conditions which
attach to such new securities. The area thus opened to judicial scrutiny in re-
organizations embraces all features of securities, which would be of significance
in any flotations - including, among others, the protective indenture provisions
of bonds and debentures and the dividend and voting aspects of stocks. A host
of other factors might be enumerated. All have significance in any evaluation
of the fairness of reorganization plans, since they relate to the measure of
subsequent protection which will be afforded to each of the interests which the
plan apportions among the varied claimants.
PROTECTIVE COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. VIII, at 156-57 (1938) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added). As some of the "other factors [which] might be 44
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This idea of institutionalizing protection pervades much of the
SEC's actions in the feasibility area and its focus is as varied as the
boundless imagination of American'business .entrepreneurs. The classic
example is the McKesson & Robins, Inc. 'eorganization.'99 There, the
debtor had facilitated, through inept 'and inadequate auditing practices,
the embezzlement of several million dollars by the debtor's president
and others.°° The SEC undertook a study of those auditing practices,
and made specific suggestions with respect to desirable changes in
auditing practices in general.20' At the Commission's urging, these
recommendations were incorporated into the corporation's by-laws.20 2
Another example is the reorganization of the Tower Credit Corpora-
tion,20 3 where the plan's promoter sought to turn what had basically
been a credit corporation into a real. estate venture. The history of
the proceeding showed that the plan's proponents, who were to control
the reorganized company, had a strong self-interest in selling heavily
mortgaged, unimproved land to the enterprise. The SEC also found
that the proponents would in all probability attempt to have the re-
organized debtor grant large stock options to them. At the insistence
of SEC, a provision was added to the plan requiring that for a period
of 5 years after emerging from reorganization, (1) purchases of un-
productive real estate (other than those made in the normal course
of business), (2) the grant of stock options to officers and directors,
and (3) any charter amendments had to be approved by a majority
of the stock, exclusive of the stock owned directly or beneficially by
the proponents of the plan.20 4
Perhaps the best example of the manner in which the SEC at-
tempts to extend their control of the reorganized debtors through the
guise of feasibility is its persistent demand that the common stock be
accorded preemptive rights 2 5 and cumulative voting,20 regardless
of whether the applicable state corporation law so requires. The SEC
has even rejected a provision which would enable offerings of con-
enumerated," the Commission cited many features traditionally discussed under the
rubric of feasibility. Id. at 157 n.253. See also Teton, Reorganization Revised, 48
YALE L.J. 573, 607-09 (1939).
199. 8 S.E.C. 853 (1941).
200. Id. at 855.
201. SEC, U.S. BEFORE S.E.C., In Matter of McKesson & Robbins, Inc., PURSUANT
TO § 21(a) OF SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934; REPORT ON INVESTIGATION (1940).
202. 7 SEC ANN. REP. 62 (1941).
203. In re Tower Credit Corp., Civil No. 66-171-Bk-T (M.D. Fla., filed August
4, 1966), discussed in 36 SEC ANN. REP. 183-85 (1970).
204. 36 SEC ANN. REP. 183-85 (1970).
205. See Parker Pet. Co., 39 S.E.C. 548, 571; Selected Inv. Trust Fund, 39 S.E.C.
37, 60 (1959).
206. See TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc., 42 S.E.C. 511, 526 (1965) ; Selected Inv.
Trust Fund, 39 S.E.C. 37, 58 (1959).
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vertible debentures to be exempted from the common shareholders'
preemptive rights without their approval.20 7 These requirements have
generally been listed in the SEC advisory reports either under the
heading of "fair and equitable plan," or under "other matters;" the
lines between the various requirements which the Commission sees
embedded in Chapter X are obviously not very clear.
The SEC has also waged a war against voting trusts; they are
seen as permanently crippling the stockholders' power to keep the re-
organized debtor out of trouble (and presumably out of the reorganiza-
tion court again). 208 Using statutory terminology, they are seen not
only as unfair, but according to the SEC they render the capital struc-
ture unfeasible. The SEC's position is that in light of the disenfran-
chisement hardship worked upon proposed shareholders there is rarely
any need for the stability a voting trust provides. 20 9  There is little
statutory authority for this nearly complete ban upon voting trusts,
and, in fact, the references in sections 216(11) and 221 (5) to "voting
trustees" seem impliedly to sanction them.21 Accordingly, the courts
have not generally shared the SEC's distaste for the voting trust.2 11
Financial writers have also been more receptive. Dewing points out
that the voting trust is able both to insure continuity of management
207. Yale Express System, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No.
311 (March 23, 1972). The Commission stated:
We are not suggesting that the reorganized company should remain permanently
under this bar. If management believes that pre-emptive rights should be modified
to permit the issue of convertible securities, it can secure such modification by a
vote of stockholders specifically directed to this proposal. We do not consider
such modification a proper proposal for inclusion in the plan. Present security
holders voting on the plan do not have the opportunity to address themselves to
this specific feature of the plan. Their only alternatives are to vote for or against
the plan in its entirety.
208. Id. 12 SEC ANN. REP. 91 (1946).
209. See Chicago & W. Towns Ry., 35 S.E.C. 290, 300-01 (1953); Inland Gas
Corp., 33 S.E.C. 688, 727-28 (1952); Cenwest' Corp., 15 S.E.C. 352, 362 (1944);
Broadway-Exchange Corp., 15 S.E.C. 256, 271 (1944).
210. Sections 216(11) and 221(5), which require the inclusion of "equitable"
provisions within the plan with respect to the procedures for election of directors,
officers, or voting trustees, and mandate that there be court satisfaction with the
identity, qualifications and affiliations of these persons, are both especially suggestive
of congressional approval of the use of the voting trust device, where appropriate, in
the reorganized debtor. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(11), 621(5) (1970).
211. One reorganization court stated:
The question is whether the voting trust provisions render the plan unfair or
impair its feasibility. The answer to that question, I believe, depends upon the
circumstances of each case and the purpose which the voting trust is intended to
and will subserve. Like any other instrument in the arsenal of corporate man-
agement it may be intended as a tool or a weapon. In this instance, I think a
voting trust for a reasonably short period will serve a very desirable purpose.
In re Lower Brdwy. Props., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 615, 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1945). See In reQuaker City Cold Storage Co., 71 F. Supp. 124, 131-32 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (10-year
trust approved). 46
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while the corporation is recuperating 12 and to prevent speculators from
gaining control of the enterprise.21 3 Further, any abuses can be mini-
mized by (a) court selection of the trustees, (b) requiring security
holder approval for certain actions, (c) limited duration, and (d)
provisions for removal of the trustee. The New York Stock Exchange,
like the SEC, has had a consistent policy disfavoring voting trusts,
and since 1926 has refused to list voting trust certificates. 214 However,
it has created an exception to this rule where voting trust certificates
are issued under court direction pursuant to Chapter X reorganiza-
tions,21" 5 and if "circumstances in a particular [Chapter X] case were
such that the 'new' common stock were eligible for listing, the fact
that the court had ordered issuance of voting trust certificates of a
reasonable life in lieu of direct issuance of the common stock would
not be a bar to listing of the voting trust certificates.."216
These opposing opinions notwithstanding, the SEC continues to
view voting trusts with alarm, except in isolated cases, 217 arguing that
any need for a voting trust is a short run exigency that cannot out-
weigh the long term dangers that invariably accompany the loss of
corporate democracy. The outlawing of the voting trust appears to be
another method whereby the Commission attempts to regulate the
reorganized debtor, and even the particular industry,2 1 long after the
reorganization has been consummated. Similar to its requirement
that cumulative voting and preemptive rights be accorded proposed
212. Cf. In re Missouri Pac. R.R., 64 F. Supp. 64, 72 (E.D. Mo. 1945) (railroad
reorganization under § 77).
213. 1 DEWING, supra note 43, at 113-16.
214. NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL § A15, at A-280 (May
15, 1969).
215. Id.
216. Letter from Arnold Kotler, Manager, Policy Division, New York Stock
Exchange, to the author, March 18, 1974. The issuer of securities resulting from the
reorganization would have to meet the original listing standards if it was delisted
during the course of the reorganization, including the three year's earnings require-
ment. Id.
217. See Jade Oil & Gas Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 289,
26 (Sept. 15, 1969) (approving a voting trust for the stock distributed to the debtor's
promoter and his associates). Mortgage Guar. Co., 8 S.E.C. 499, 507 (1941) (stress-
ing the independence of the court-appointed voting trustees). In a reorganization
arising under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79
et seq. (1970), the SEC objected to a voting trust on theoretical grounds, but approved
it's implementation anyway, largely due to the pleas of the creditors. United Tel. &
Elec. Co., 3 S.E.C. 653, 659-61 (1938). The SEC has also implied that the joining
of stock and bonds to prevent the purchase of stock control by unscrupulous investors
may be acceptable where other solutions cannot be found. Philadelphia & W. Ry.,
13 S.E.C. 330, 337 (1943).
218. PROTECTIVE COMm. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. III, at 198-99 (commenting that
the extensive use of voting trusts in the reorganization of real estate companies has
resulted in a large "concentration of power ... [of] great economic significance, and
that effective measures have to be instituted, through the reorganization process, to
control this power.").
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shareholders,219 it matters little what the applicable state law states
regarding voting trusts.22 ° In this respect it is seeking to impose a
continuing federal influence on the reorganized debtor. Without any
apparent justification, the SEC also disregards the fact that the scope
and duration of a voting trust can be modified so as to remove some
of the objectionable features and decrease the chance of abuse.221
Brief mention should also be made here of the functional difference
between the power to form the new management of the reorganized
entity and the fair distribution of voting control.22 Section 221 (5)
requires that the reorganization court must be satisfied with the quali-
fications of the new management before approving the plan,223 reflecting
a congressional intent to give the court freedom to excise inefficient
or disloyal old management from the debtor. Section 216(11) adds that
the reorganization plan "shall include provisions which are equitable,
compatible with the interests of creditors and stockholders, and con-
sistent with public policy, with respect to the manner of selection of
... directors, officers, or voting trustees .... -224 This section "directs
the scrutiny of the court to the methods by which the management of
the reorganized corporation is to be chosen."'225 This provision, adopted
at the suggestion of the SEC, is intended to make it possible for the
reorganization court to frame the mechanics or means of selecting
future managements - managements that "will carry forward the
reorganization in the interests of the parties. ' ' 2''
To reiterate, the concept of feasibility with respect to the SEC
is nothing more than a highly calculated estimate that a reorganized
and recapitalized debtor will succeed financially in the future. The
Commission hopes to avoid a second reorganization or liquidation
through bankruptcy, and it realizes that mere faith is not enough.
Moreover, the SEC has an interest of its own to protect, namely its
reputation for financial expertise. It certainly would not further such
a reputation if a state court, subsequent to consummation of an SEC
approved plan, criticized the Commission for failing to include cumu-
lative voting or preemptive rights, or for including an unfair voting
219. See notes 205-07 and accompanying text supra.
220. The courts, however, have held that any state law restrictions on voting
trusts must be observed. E.g., Bakers Share Corp. v. London Terrace, Inc., 130 F.2d
157, 159 (2d Cir. 1942).
221. See note 211 and accompanying text supra.
222. For an extended analysis, see generally Krotinger, supra note 191.
223. 11 U.S.C. § 621(5) (1970). See also 6A COLLIER, supra note 4, at 1 11.10;
PROTECTIVE COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. VIII, at 156-59.
224. 11 U.S.C. § 616(11) (1970).
225. S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1938).
226. Hearings on H.R. 6439, Amended and Reintroduced as H.R. 8046, Before
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 143 (1937). 48
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trust, or for allowing an unsavory management to gain control of the
debtor and proceed to loot it. To the extent that the Commission be-
lieves a plan will facilitate such events, that plan is not feasible because
it fails to meet the standard of being consistent with "public policy" -
"something more than just the old concepts of a selfish creditor interest
and a selfish stockholder interest" is required. 2 '
H. Effect on the Future Cost of Capital
In line with the Commission's future-oriented view towards feasi-
bility, the effect of a plan on the ability of the reorganized debtor to
secure additional amounts of capital is certainly an important element
to consider.221
Much has been written on the question of whether or not the
reorganization process influences the debtor's prospective cost of cap-
ital. 2 29 The Commission, rather than struggling with theoretical cost of
capital problems, simply takes the position that a corporation emerges
from Chapter X reorganization as a healthy, expanding enterprise. 23 0
As such, the chances are strong that it will ultimately resort to the
capital markets, albeit after an interim period to allow the stigma
of bankruptcy to dissipate.2 3 ' One need hardly be a financial expert
to realize the difficulties that a reorganized debtor must contend with
in attempting to attract new capital from the investing public, although
the experience of debt securities distributed in reorganizations has been
surprisingly good. 21 2 The Commission believes that a feasible plan
must not hinder the difficult task of securing additional financing.
Accordingly, the SEC attempts to manipulate the proposed pktn
in order to enable the debtor to have adequate access to both short-
and long-term credit in the future.2 3 The insistence on an adequate
sinking fund also reflects this concern. Lowering the company's risk
of default and strengthening the firm's credit is more important in
attracting new investors than an extensive dividend record in the early
227. Id. at 182 (statement of then SEC Commissioner, now Mr. Justice, Douglas).
228. FINANCIAL HANDBOOK § 22, at 13 (4th ed. J. Bogen 1964).
229. The arguments pro and con are explored in a book by Professor Altman.
E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA (1971).
230. The obvious exception is where limited life is admitted. See notes 180-83
and accompanying text supra.
231. For a brief discussion of the SEC recognition of the earnings lag phenomenon,
see Blum, Corporate Reorganization Doctrine as Recently Applied by the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 96, 96-98 (1972).
232. See generally W. HICKMAN, CORPORATE BOND QUALITY AND INVESTOR
EXPERIENCE (1958) ; Calkins, supra note 154.
233. See Indiana Lime. Corp., 18 S.E.C. 178, 195 (1945) ; McKesson & Robbins,
Inc., 8 S.E.C. 853, 881 (1941)
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years after reorganization.234 In the same vein, the SEC will also act
to limit the amount of common stock issued,235 in order that the shares
outstanding can achieve a nonspeculative investment status, and thus
someday become a suitable vehicle for financing. 236 In connection with
this predilection to increase the price of the reorganized debtor's com-
mon stock is the Commission's clear repugnance to the use of warrants
which are viewed as an unnecessary risk of dilution and thus a brake
on the upward price movement of the stock.
237
Simplification of the reorganized debtor's capital structure can
also affect the future cost of capital. For example, divisional mort-
gages, collateral trusts, and other complexities which impede financing
can be eliminated. The structure of parent-subsidiary relationships can
also be rearranged to this end.3 8
There are other examples of how the plan of reorganization can
provide for future financing, but their discussion is unnecessary; yet,
they are reflective of a general attitude of the Commission rather than
a focused analysis of the tools of corporate finance. One cannot help
observing that reorganization plans invariably try to sell the great
new opportunities ahead and the dynamic nature of the reorganized
enterprise. The Commission, not being able to write its own plan,
must confront these claims, and parry them with the baton of feasibility
by inquiring into where the needed cash for all this growth is going
to come.
I. Simple Capital Structure
The element of simplicity in the capital structure of the reorganized
debtor has always been a prime consideration of the SEC in assessinsg
the feasibility of a plan. Aside from its obstructive effect on the debtor's
ability to raise additional capital, a complex capital structure seems to
be per se unfeasible. In Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuB ois, 239
the Supreme Court reviewed a Ninth Circuit ruling that a class of
claimants whose debt was secured by specific properties could be com.-
pensated out of those properties alone; thus, the fair and equitable
standard was violated if several old, separately secured debt issues were
replaced with a single new issue representing an interest in all of theq
234. See text accompanying notes 184-88 supra. But cf. Inland Gas Corp., 38
S.E.C. 320, 35-56 (1958).
235. See note 189 and accompanying text supra.
236. Cf. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 949, 978 (D.N.J. 1974)
(investment value, not market price, of new shares is the concern of the reorgani-
zation court in determining a plan's fairness and feasibility).
237. See note 166 and accompanying text supra.
238. Cf. Central States Elec. Corp., 30 S.E.C. 680, 714-16 (1949).
239. 312 U.S. 510 (1941). 50
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properties.24 ° To the SEC, this was folly and would have "disastrous
practical consequences."1241  In their amicus brief, the Commission
pointed out that the Bankruptcy Act required a plan to be feasible as
well as fair and equitable, and argued that the circuit court's holding
might make feasibility impossible in some cases:
If the holding of the court below is correct, a plan of reorganization
which fails to preserve priorities of separate lienors . . . cannot be
fair. Yet in many cases any plan attempting to preserve separate
liens would necessitate so complicated a capital structure that it
would not be feasible. Consequently, in some cases, no plan of
reorganization complying with the statutory standards would be
possible.242
The Supreme Court agreed with the Commission and said that there
was absolutely no need to preserve separate liens.243 Mr. Justice
Douglas lent further support to the SEC's policy of favoring simple
capital structures by stating:
Moreover, the substitution of a simple, conservative capital struc-
ture for a highly complicated one may be a primary requirement of
any reorganization plan. There is no necessity to construct the
new capital structure on the framework of the old.244
Feasibility, in the view of the Commission, thus contemplates a
simple capital structure. This would appear to include a prohibition
against embellishing the new securities with various fringe features
which might be misleading. This role is coterminous with the Com-
mission's role as the protector of the securities markets, since it focuses
on those factors which made intelligent and well-informed investment
decisions by investors more unlikely. 45 Post-reorganization assessment
of newly created securities is sufficiently difficult without the exacerbat-
ing effect of a complex capital structure. Further, such a structure
serves to mask the true impact of the plan and hinders a full SEC
analysis of the satisfaction of investor and creditor claims.246
,1 The SEC approaches the issue of simplicity of capital structure
with a degree of flexibility. In most instances where the structure is
240. In re Consolidated Rock Prods. Co., 114 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1940), aff'd
on other grounds sub norn., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Dubois, 312 U.S. 510
(1941).
241. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 50, Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v.
DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
242. Id. at 51-52.
243. 312 U.S. at 530.
244. Id. at 531. The Court also seemed to have denoted feasibility as the source
of this requirement. Id. at 528.
245. See Frank, supra note 41, at 345-48.
246. Cf. Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No.
312, at 40 (July 12, 1972).
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complex, the Commission will complain of, but not object to, the plan
on feasibility grounds.247 The SEC realizes that creating an additional
priority class of securities is often more manageable than returning the
plan to the reorganization court for inquiry into how much "extra
compensation" a class of old security holders may be entitled to in units
of a new single class of stock.
2 48
Note, however, that the endeavor to simplify capital structures
cannot obscure the fact that the reorganization court is one of limited
jurisdiction. 249 Accordingly, in the case where a subsidiary is not
undergoing reorganization, either because no petition has been filed
by or against it or because it is not eligible for relief under Chapter X,
the jurisdiction of the reorganization court in which the parent's pro-
ceeding is pending presents special problems with respect to the sub-
sidiary. The reorganization court generally interprets its jurisdiction
over the parent as narrowly limited to the parent's property owner-
ship, that is, to the stock held by the paren.t corporation. As stated
by one circuit court, "Ownership of all the outstanding stock of a cor-
portation, however, is not the equivalent of ownership of the subsidi-
ary's property or assets. '25" This parent-subsidiary distinction must be
recognized even where both the parent and the subsidiary are in reor-
ganization in different jurisdictions.25 '
Consistent with this approach is the general rule that section
116(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 25 2 does not authorize the Chapter X
court to enjoin a suit against a subsidiary of the debtor merely be-
cause its stock is held by the debtor in reorganization.2 53 If the sub-
247. See Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 38 S.E.C. 676, 710 (1958); Inland Gas
Corp., 29 S.E.C. 377, 402-03 (1948) ; Warner Sugar Co., 17 S.E.C. 355, 370 (1944)
Penn Timber Co., 17 S.E.C. 107, 114-15 (1944).
248. See, e.g., Inland Gas Corp., 29 S.E.C. 377, 402--03 (1948).
249. "Congress did not give the bankruptcy court exclusive jurisdiction over all
controversies that in some way affect the debtor's estate." Callaway v. Benton, 336
U.S. 132, 142 (1949) (footnote omitted). See generally 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 3.11.
250. In re Beck Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 410, 415 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
858 (1973). Accord, In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849, 851 (2d Cir. 1936) (under
§ 77B); Liman v. Midland Bank Ltd., 309 F. Supp. 163, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
251. See In re Tonkawa Ref. Co., 502 F.2d 1341, 1343 (10th Cir. 1974).
252. 11 U.S.C. § 516(4) (1970).
253.: See In re South Jersey Land Corp., 361 F.2d 610, 613 (3d Cir. 1966). Cf.
In re Adolf Gobel, Inc., 80 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1936) (under § 77B) ; In re Madison
Mfg. Corp., 22 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (under § 77B). Note, however, that a
reorganization court does have the power to enjoin a subsidiary from wasting its
own assets, at least where it is doing so at the direction of the debtor. Cf. In re
Associated Gas & Elec. Co., 11 F. Supp. 359 (N.D.N.Y. 1935) (under § 77B), noted
in 30 ILL. L. REV. 796 (1936). It has also been suggested that where the stock of a
wholly-owned subsidiary is the major asset of a debtor in reorganization, the court
may act to protect the value of that stock by restraining a state public utility com-
missioner from reducing rate schedules of the subsidiary, and by restraining the
officers of the subsidiary from consenting thereto. In re Portland Elec. Power Co.,
97 F. Supp. 877, 882 (D. Ore. 1943). 52
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sidiary is solvent and thus cannot be forced into reorganization, it
may refrain from participating in the parent's proceeding, and the
reorganization court cannot adjust the rights of .the subsidiary if it
does so.254 If the subsidiary is insolvent, a petition by or against it
may be filed in the court where the reorganization proceeding of the
parent corporation is pending under section 129,255 or under the
regular venue provisions of section 128.256
This distinction between the parent and 'the subsidiary must also
extend to the parent's ability to effectuate a workable plan of reorgani-
zation with creditors. Although a plan may incorporate the sale or
-transfer of the assets of a subsidiary not in reorganization, the pro-
vision, since 'it is in the nature of an offer, has no binding contractual
force on the subsidiary until accepted. Of course, if accepted, the sub-
sidiary comes within the jurisdiction of the court sufficiently to give
the court new powers 'to protect and insure the consummation of
the plan. 2
57
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. The dis-
tinction between parent and subsidiary may be disregarded when
they are so completely one that the subsidiary cannot be considered
to have a separate legal identity.2 5 8 The court will look behind the
corporate entities involved to deal with the situation as "equity" may
require, not only for the purpose of holding the parent corporation
for debts created by the insolvent corporate subsidiary which is a mere
instrumentality of its parent, but also to allow creditors of the parent
to reach assets held by the subsidiary. 259 This instrumentality concept
has evolved from well established corporate law precedents2 60 and
from equity receiverships. 6
254. See Commercial Cable Staffs' Ass'n v. Lehman, 107 F.2d 917, 920 (2d Cir.
1939) (under § 77B), noted in 49 YALE L.J. 590 (1940). If the parent corporation
is involved in a reorganization, the subsidiary is not a necessary party thereto. In re
Commonwealth Light & Power Co., 141 F.2d 734, 736 (7th Cir.), appeal dismissed,
322 U.S. 766 (1944) (under § 77B), noted in 43 MICH. L. REV. 811 (1945).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 529 (1970).
256. 11 U.S.C. § 528 (1970).
257. Cf. Commercial Cable Staffs' Ass'n v. Lehman, 107 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1939)
(by implication) (under § 77B).
258. E.g., In re Parkview-Gem, Inc., 2 BANKR. L. REP. 65,309, at 74,492 (8th
Cir., July 1, 1974). See generally 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, 11 3.11, at 500-01.
259. Cf. Stone v. Eacho, 127 F.2d 284, 288 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 635
(1942) (straight bankruptcy).
260. See generally 1 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE COR-
PORATIONS §§ 25, 43 (rev. ed. 1963) ; 13 id. § 6222 (rev. ed. 1961).
261. See, e.g., Commerce Trust Co. v. Woodbury, 77 F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 614 (1935); Trustees Sys. Co. v. Payne, 65 F.2d 103, 107
(3d Cir. 1933). Note that under section 115, the reorganization court has all the
powers "which a court of the United States would have if it had appointed a receiver
in equity of the property of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 515 (1970).
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The classic example262 of the reorganization court's misuse of its
limited power over subsidiaries can be found in the reorganization
of a complex interrelationship of companies in the Pittsburgh trans-
portation system.2 6' On appeal, the Third Circuit, stressing the public
interest and the necessity of dealing with the reorganization from the
practical economic viewpoint, and of treating the various companies
as a single entity,264 seemingly went too far in framing a convenient
-reorganization by disregarding the distinction between legal owner-
ship and physical operation. 2" Though the case has not been over-
ruled, its vitality is in doubt.26 Recently, however, the need to enlarge
bankruptcy court jurisdiction to deal effectively with complex cor-
porate structures has been judicially recognized. 26 7
J. Cash Flow
The subject of adequate working capital is treated last because of
its signal importance to the feasibility inquiry. If inability to meet
principal or interest payments when due is the factor which precipi-
tates bankruptcy, then it would seem that the apparent cause of in-
solvency is inadequate working capital. The emphasis is on "apparent"
because the Commission must confront the more basic question of
why the working capital was inadequate.268 So too, if one of the objec-
tives of feasibility is to decrease the risk of financial embarrassment
in the future, the SEC must demand that any plan provide not only
enough working capital for immediate needs, but also provide a mar-
gin for contingencies.
262. In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 731
(1946).
263. 155 F.2d at 479--O.
264. Id. at 485.
265. 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, 1 3.11, at 50 n.7.
266. Cf. Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 (1949), discussed in Gerdes,
Current Reorganization Legislation and Decisions, 5 Bus. LAW. 249, 252-54 (1950).
267. See In re Central R.R., 469 F.2d 857, 869 (3d Cir. 1972) (Adams, J., dis-
senting) ; In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 671, 677 (3d Cir. 1970). The
statutory language of Chapter X could be interpreted to accomplish this end. 11
U.S.C. § 511 (1970). Although it ignores the corporate structure problem, the Pro-
posed Act does expand the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Section
2-201 of the Proposed Act extends the jurisdiction to "all controversies that arise out
of a case commenced under this Act." REPORT OF THE CoMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, at 30 (1973). The accompanying note
states that the provisions broaden present bankruptcy court jurisdiction. Id. at 32.
The Proposed Act also attempts to develop a specific bankruptcy concept of "property."
Compare section 70(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1970)
and section 116(4) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 516(4) (1970) with Proposed
Act section 4-601 and the note thereto, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANK-
RUPTcy LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, pt. II, at 147-52 (1973).
268. W. CURRAN, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 546-49 (1970). 54
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The SEC's approach to the working capital problem in terms of
feasibility2 9 seems to be short-term oriented. At times, it has included
references to quick ratios in its reports, 270 and has even focused upon
the working capital to funded debt relationship.27' If immediate cash
is needed, a new securities offering or a loan may be planned. How-
ever, the SEC does not believe that the plan can be approved as feasible
until the success of the anticipated financing is somewhat assured,272
and the reorganization court should retain jurisdiction over the debtor,
if necessary, until the advent of the anticipated financing.27 It should
also be noted that -the trusteeship period can be used to accumulate
earnings and build up working capital. The trustee also has the
power to dispose of unnecessary assets and unprofitable portions of
the debtor's business, 74 and thus attempt to accumulate cash.275
With regard to long-term cash flow analysis, many financial
authorities feel that the standard tests for determining an appropriate
level of debt financing should be discarded in favor of a cash flow
approach. 276 By analyzing long-term cash flow patterns, it is hoped
that the firm will be able to calculate its real ability to service its debt.
The debt capacity question is seen as just one part of a broader prob-
lem of determining the capacity of the enterprise in question to assume
additional amounts of fixed cash outflows of any nature:
With regard to the threat of cash insolvency, debt is no dif-
ferent from any other contractual obligation to pay fixed amounts
at fixed dates in an uncertain future and, indeed, is not essentially
269. The SEC considers the adequacy of working capital to be part of the feasi-
bility inquiry. See Silesian-American Corp., 31 S.E.C. 1, 72-73 (1950) ; cf. PROTEC-
TIVE COMM. REPORT, supra note 6, pt. VIII, at 160.
270. E.g., Westec Corp., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 282, at 19
(Jan. 3, 1969) ; F. L. Jacobs Co., 42 S.E.C. 979 n.10 (1966).
271. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 7 S.E.C. 174, 195 (1940) (the SEC thought that the
debtor should have no funded debt at all, but approved a large debt issue as feasible
"in the light of its apparent ability to meet the interest charges thereon and the fact
that the debtor would have working capital equal to approximately 90 percent of the
face amount of its funded debt").
272. See, In re Oceanside Properties, Inc., Civil No. 67-109 (D. Hawaii, filed
April 4, 1967), discussed in 33 SEC ANN. REP. 136- (1967) (interim and long-term
financing for. a condominium development); Parker Petroleum Co., 39 S.E.C. 666,
673 (1960); Parker Petroleum Co., 39 S.E.C. 548, 574 (1959) (proposed stock
offering) ; In re Stardust, Inc., Civil No. 955 (D. Nev., filed July 19, 1956), discussed
in 24 SEC ANN. REP. 141-42 (1958) (proposed purchase of debtor's assets or invest-
ment of new capital in debtor) ; Penn Timber Co., 9 S.E.C. 1063, 1076-77 (1941)
(proposed loan).
273. Brief for the S.E.C. at 9-13, In re Tower Credit Corp., Civil No. 69-270
(M.D. Fla., filed Jan. 21, 1970).
274. The Chapter X trustee has these powers which are vested in a straight bank-
ruptcy trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 587 (1970).
275. See, e.g., Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Re-
lease No. 312 (July 12, 1972).
276. See, e.g., P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS &.G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE
ch. 20 (4th ed. 1971).
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different from noncontractual fixed payments which must con-
tinue if the business is to continue. An illustration of this fact
is seen in the increasing awareness that rental payments under
a lease or sale-and-leaseback arrangement contain inherently the
same risk element as an equivalent debt service charge.
Thus the risk of debt is seen as a part of the overall problem
of the balancing of the amount and time of cash inflows and cash
,outflows. Virtually all businesses face some degree of uncertainty
in the amount and timing of cash inflows, and the existence of
inflexibility in cash outflows presents the hazard of inability to
match outflows and inflows at some point in time.
Viewed in this way the measurement of the risk of debt
becomes a part of a general appraisal of expected variations in
total cash inflow, on the one hand, and of the controllability of
total cash outflows, on the other. From this appraisal manage-
ment can form a judgment as to the probability of the event of
insolvency and the extent to which the probability is increased
by the substitution of a given amount of debt for equity as a
source of permanent financing. 77
The SEC has yet to adopt this approach in its entirety, although it has
recognized the use of the projected cash flow method of valuation in
certain circumstances. 278
IV. ON DEVELOPING A THEORY
There has never been expressed a unitary concept of the metho-
dology employed by 'the SEC in determining the feasibility of a
Chapter X reorganization plan. In all likelihood, this is due to the
staggering variety and complexity of the reorganization plans the
Commission has faced in its advisory role in Chapter X proceedings.
Its expertise in handling these difficult problems cannot ,be challenged,
and with that in mind, perhaps it would be best to begin the analysis
with what the Commission could do in interpreting the feasibility
requirement.
Initially, the SEC could interpret feasibility as mandating a com-
plete purge of the debtor, such that the characteristics which precipi-
tated the inability to pay debts as they matured were shorn from the
debtor in a neat fashion, and the debtor could be permitted to return
to the business world without a risk of recurrent financial dilemma.
Additionally, discredited management should be thoroughly investi-
gated and prosecuted, as provided for in Chapter X. 279 Where the
277. DONALDSON, supra note 85, at 7-8.
278. See Jade Oil & Gas Co., S.E.C. Corporate Reorganization Release No. 289
(Sept. 15, 1969); Parker Petroleum Co., 39 S.E.C. 548, 559-60 (1959).
279. Pursuant to section 167, the court has the power to order the trustee to
investigate the old management and sue for misconduct or mismanagement. 11 U.S.C. 56
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management has been at fault, the reorganized debtor's charter and
the various securities contracts should be rewritten, mindful of pre-
venting future managements from damaging the debtor or taking
unjustified financial risks. Most important, the amount of debt which
the debtor can lawfully issue should be severely restricted, since in
most reorganization situations, 'overextension with respect to debt is
the prime cause of financial distress. Such restrictions could be im-
posed without a sense of retribution or punishment as otker corpora-
tions, not subject -to reorganization, have similar undesirable features.
However, reorganization is the opportune time for the visitation of
the SEC's expertise and powers upon the debtor; the investment con-
tracts have matured, the court has stepped in to preserve the entity,
and significant policy judgments must be made as to the future status
of the corporation. To quote at length from a classic exposition of
this view:
Historically, of course, we are committed 'to the practice of
regarding some part of capital as debt, and correlatively, the
holders of that debt have the status of current-account creditors
for purposes of creditors' remedies. It is probably impossible to
change the deep-seated habit of treating bondholders as creditors
for such purposes. And so long as default on capitalized debt is
regarded as the occasion of reorganization proceedings, it is
desirable that the resulting reorganizations be drastic. If we
must have a judicial proceeding after default on capitalized debt,
that proceeding should thoroughly purge the finances of the busi-
ness. And the administration of Chapter X, at least, promises
that reorganization will have adequate purgative features.
An acceptable reorganization system should, however, do
more than is done by Chapters X and XI to control the future
financial structure of reorganized enterprises, in the interest of
preventing the recurrence of uneconomic insolvency proceedings.
Ideally, such a policy would be expressed by a prohibition in the
charter of the new company against any form of capitalization
resulting in fixed charges or fixed maturities. All capital returns
would be contingent on there being earnings above operating
expenses, priority of risk being expressed by priority of claim to
income. If habits of finance and of thinking about finance among
those who constitute the capital market will keep reorganizers
from writing such utopian terms into articles of incorporation,
they should at least be required to restrict the quantity or pro-
§ 567 (1970). See generally 6 COLLIER, supra note 4, ff 7.20. Where the debtor is in
possession, section 168 allows an examiner to be appointed for this and other purposes.
11 U.S.C. § 568 (1970). The reorganized debtor or the trustees have full power to
continue this investigation and prosecution of these causes of action after the plan
is submitted or confirmed; and in fact, a plan is not "fair" unless it adequately pre-
serves these causes of action and provides for their prosecution. In re Philadelphia &
Reading Coal & Iron Co., 105 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1939). See generally 6A
COLLIER, supra note 4, 11 10.22.
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portion of an enterprise's capital which may be obtained through
borrowing. The control of capital structures through reorgani-
zation should go further. It is generally regarded as dangerous
-to have much of the capitalization of a business represented by
securities on which a fixed maximum return is payable. Such a
financial structure promises a new default with every consider-
able fluctuation of income, and tempts the directors to speculative
managerial policies. If the capitalization of a company carries
large fixed or maximum charges, its management, usually hold-
ing equities, stands to gain disproportionately from a course of
action, however risky, which increases the existing over-all rate
of return on capital. And so far no device short of charter restric-
tion has developed for protecting the corporation against its man-
agement in this particular of financial policy ....
Any substantial revision of the system of corporate reor-
ganization -through bankruptcy should start with a reconsidera-
tion of the economic function of such proceedings, and should
serve the definite policy of making .them an occasion to rebuild
the financial structure of the debtor enterprise. The plan of reor-
ganization should give management all the discretion it needs to
meet the future financing requirements of the business; but that
discretion should be restricted so as to forestall the danger of
over-speculative business policy, 'and the waste of premature
reorganization.' s°
The implication seems clear - if the court is given the oppor-
tunity to step in and halt 'the dissolution of the debtor, it would then
benefit all interests to effect a thorough reconstruction of its financial
framework. The debtor cannot and should not be relied upon to take
care of itself once it is free of the court's supervision, and therefore,
a complete revision of the enterprise's finances is required.
Although there is much to be said for and against this purgative
approach to feasibility, manifestly, part of this theory pervades the
SEC's performance under Chapter X.2 ' For example, the Commis-
sion has always stressed the importance of a thorough investigation
of the former management by the trustee, and this investigation takes
precedence over any desire to speed up the reorganization process. 28 2
The theory starts in a very difficult area, as it represents an extreme
fascination with 'the interplay 'between the economic and legal defini-
280. Rostow & Cutler, Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapters
X & XI of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334, 1374-76 (1939) (footnotes omitted).
281. See, e.g., 10 SEC ANN. REP. 145-46 (1944).
282. See, e.g., id. The duty of the trustee to investigate is required by Chapter X.
See note 279 supra. As one commentator recently reflected:
[O]ne cannot but be impressed with the recurring theme that the troubles of
the debtor are due in a large part to the sins of its past management. An in-
dependent trustee is necessary to discover these sins, to punish the sinners and
to recover the loot.
Coogan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973: Questions for the Non-Bankruptcy
Lawyer, 29 Bus. LAW. 729, 743 (1974). 58
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tions of financial failure in order to justify heavy-handed intervention
at this point in time. The ultimate result sought would appear to be
the emergence from reorganization of a debt-free corporation. 8 3
This theory, steeped in the idea of purging the debtor of the ability
to incur any significant debt, obviously had its genesis in the wake of
the Great Depression, when stabilization of the economy was the gov-
ernment's primary concern. In both the late 1930's2"4 and 1940's,2"'
there was a great fear of debt financing among economists, and per-
haps an even greater fear of the chain reaction effect of bankruptcy
on the economy. The thought prevailed that the main cause of the
depression was excessive debt financing, and ergo, limiting debt was
an effective way to limit fluctuation in the economy. 286 The reorgani-
zation and bankruptcy process could directly contribute to economic
recovery and stabilization by eliminating a large amount of debt and
supplanting it with equity.
2 7
There is no need to treat extensively the various countervailing
arguments to the SEC's theory. It is clear that the SEC was not
empowered to execute the policy underlying this theory,288 and it is
equally apparent that Congress, had it so desired, could have required
a 100 percent equity capital structure to be used in all reorganizations.
In any event, the economic postulates behind this theory have come
under attack; the "New Economics" holds that government fiscal and
monetary policy suffices to keep the country out of another depression.
The economic boom of the 1960's and the great proliferation of debt
283. This idea has been stated:
All corporations should be held to a Spartan simplicity in their capital structures.
There should be the sharpest distinction between investors and creditors; and,
where this distinction becomes impaired through financial adversity, reorganiza-
tion should be compulsory and immediate. It would seem wise, indeed, to require
the maintenance of a predominant residual equity and to limit narrowly (say to
20 percent) the percentage of contractual obligations to total assets.
H. SIMONs, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SociTY 60 (1948).
284. See Simons, Rules Versus Authorities in Monetary Policy, 44 J. POL. EcoN.
1, at 6-7 (1936), where the author stated:
An approximately ideal condition is fairly obvious - and unattainable. The
danger of pervasive, synchronous, cumulative maladjustments would be minimized
if there were no fixed money contracts at all - if all property were held in a
residual-equity or common stock form. With such a financial structure, no one
would be in a position either to create effective money substitutes (whether for
circulation or for hoarding) or to force enterprises into wholesale efforts at
liquidation. Hoarding and dishoarding (changes in velocity) would, to be sure,
still occur; but the dangers of cumulative maladjustment would be minimized.
Id. See also Friedman, The Monetary Theory & Policy of Henry Simons, 10 J. LAW
& EcoN. 2 (1967).
285. See Jones, Investment Prospects, 2 J. FINANCE 15 (1947) (warning that the
country faced another depression if savers continued to invest in debt).
286. See generally I. FisHER, Boo s AND DEPRESSIONS (1932).
287. Jones, supra note 285, at 26-27.
288. The SEC's role in Chapter X proceedings is merely advisory. See text
accompanying note 59 supra.
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financing during those years is proof of the faith in that belief. How-
ever, it remains clear that a general aversion to debt appears in almost
any reorganization. In this sense, the view of feasibility presented is not
so much a theory as a general attitude, and that 'attitude has endured.
Another attitude, diametric to that described above, conceivably
could also 'have been adopted by the SEC. If the first approach to feasi-
bility maximizes SEC intervention, this second approach is designed
to minimize it. It reflects the belief that no need for intervention exists
at the time of reorganization; the capital structure of .the reorganized
debtor will be determined by the market valuation process, and the
debtor will obtain that structure which maximizes the value of the
stockholders' equity. On a theoretical level, there are many factors
which affect the capital structure of a corporation.289 The market, as
the grand and invisible allocator of investment funds in our society,
ultimately evaluates these factors. In the nonbankruptcy situation,
the corporation would issue incremental amounts of the least expen-
sive form of financing (debt) until the point is reached at which the
cost of capital is minimized. That capital structure will maximize
the value of the equity in the firm. This market theory poses the de-
ceptively simple question of why can't 'the management be allowed
to ascertain which is the value-maximizing mix of securities to issue,
especially if management is identified with the common shareholders.
Notice that while the purgative theory of feasibility makes a judgment
about the societal and economic harms of a subsequent reorganization
of bankruptcy, this market theory makes no such policy decision. Con-
trawise, the market theory confronts an area the first theory avoids -
maximizing the value of the firm, thereby maximizing the number of
participants in the reorganization.
In light of the previous exposition of the economic environment of
Chapter X reorganizations, the basic problem with the market theory
seems clear - everything about a reorganization suggests total aban-
donment or avoidance of the market processes. Congress provided for
reorganizations to avoid the natural and foreseeable market response to
a corporation which cannot pay its debts as they mature - piecemeal
liquidation of the debtor. The market place is prevented from arbi-
trating the rewards and penalties due the various investors in the
financially distressed corporation. Further, the reorganization mech-
anism is not geared to the market value of the entire enterprise, but
289. J.F. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 264-66 (4th ecl. 1972),
lists the following as the most important determinants of a firm's capital structure:
(1) growth rate of future sales; (2) stability of future sales; (3) competitive struc-
ture of the industry; (4) asset structure of the firm; (5) control position and atti-
tudes toward risk of owners and management; and (6) lenders' attitude toward
the firm and industry. 60
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rather to the reorganization value of the firm. Cash value in the market
is rarely relevant since it is alien to the process. 290 The point is that
the securities of a debtor have no market value during a reorganization,
other than as pieces of hope. The reorganized debtor cannot issue
incremental amounts of debt until the lowest net cost of capital is
reached, and given this situation, the market will not respond. The
mix of securities issued pursuant to a plan is in no way connected
with or a function of the market valuation of the debtor. There is no'
market to indicate whether to issue six percent debt or eight percent
debt, or whether to halt the- issue of debt and start to issue equity.
Since the recipients of these reorganization tickets, whether they are
debt or equity, do not have a choice of investing in the debtor or
another company, the reorganization court's deliberations upon feasi-
bility are not circumscribed by the limitations of the market place.
It is only after the reorganization is complete that a market de-
velops so as to assess the securities issued. The price at which they
sell operates as a link between the reorganization value and the market
value of the debtor as a whole, although even then, the prices of the
securities are artificially depressed due to the stigma of the reorganiza-
tion. In this context, the question of fairness arises precisely because
this link, which acts as a basis for comparison, is a totally unknown
quantity until the reorganization process and its concomitant shock
wave have run their course.
Thus, the SEC and the courts must act in lieu of the market to
shape the debtor's new capital structure. This intervention reflects a
judgment that the debtor should not be trusted to formulate its own
plan of reorganization with any miscalculations rectified later on a trial
and error basis. Yet the market theory does have a practical effect on
Chapter X reorganizations. The SEC, notwithstanding its expertise in
the area, does not act as a substitute for the parties to the reorganization
as it is empowered to submit a proposed plan of reorganization to the
290. There are, however, two exceptions. The court must take into account the
real, cash value of the reorganization tickets distributed under a plan when trying
to fix an upset price for a dissenting class under sections 216(7) (b) and 216(8) (a).
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7) (b), (8) (a) (1970). To the extent that this price is to be a
realistic one, the court must guess at the market price of the debtor and the price
the reorganization tickets will command after the process is completed. The courts
have shown some confusion in this regard. Compare Keeskin Freight Lines, Inc.,
29 S.E.C. 724 (1949), with In re Keeskin Freight Lines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 439 (N.D.
Ill. 1949). See also Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 593. Under sections 216(7) (c)
& 216(8) (b), the court has the alternative of protecting a dissenting class by
satisfying their claims with a direct payment of cash. 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7) (c), (8) (b)
(1970). Presumably, this also requires the court to examine the relationship between
reorganization value and the estimated market value of the reorganization tickets
which the class had a right to receive. See generally 6A COLLIER, supra note 4,
at 10.16.
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court. The parties who do formulate and submit plans, however, have
the weight of self-interest behind them and in all probability they will
follow the rational rules of the market in order to attempt to maximize
the value of the firm. The SEC can do no more than disprove the plans
as either subject to excessive risks or as irrational in light of the finan-
cial risks to be undertaken.
These two contrasting theories discussed above are merely polar
ends of a conceptual continuum of the extent to which the SEC or the
court will intervene in a reorganization proceeding. Neither the SEC
nor the court is capable of constructing an entirely new enterprise upon
the remains of the old, for this could not be accomplished without the
ideas of the various parties who composed the old enterprise, be
they management, employees, or creditors. These are parties who
have the responsibility and interest of maintaining the reorganized
debtor, not the court. However, the SEC and the court cannot allow
the parties a completely free hand in restructuring an enterprise in
which they have varying and potentially conflicting interests. 29'
The bottom line to all this is that feasibility is dictated neither
by the SEC nor by management; it is negotiated.192 The give and take
between the various parties, the court, and the SEC takes place long
before the SEC undertakes to render a formal advisory report on a
proposed plan of a reorganization. The SEC's attitude is not one of
replacing completely the influence of the market, but rather one of
mediation during the reorganization process. It is a brake, not a
dictator - a brake on each of various parties' demands that they each
know what is best for the reorganized debtor.
With this as a premise, some commentators have suggested pos-
sible analogies to other instances of judicial intervention in the forma-
tion of a capital structure. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have sug-
gested that the Deep Rock doctrine2 3 and the doctrine of "thin" incor-
291. It must also be doubted that railroad management can in the future be re-
lied upon, without restrictions contained in the capital structure itself, to keep a
reorganized capital structure sound. The investments of management are usually
in junior securities indeed, usually in stock. This will accentuate management's
natural interest to raise money at 'the lowest cost possible, that is, through the
issue of the most senior securities available at the time. Even creditor repre-
sentatives in management will be inclined to keep the cost of new money down,
at the expense of sending the debt ratio up. This is not at all to criticize either
equity or creditor management: the inducements referred to are compelling and
it would require a farsightedness beyond the qualities of most human beings
to resist them.
Brief for Debtor at 64, Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., No. 10882 (I.C.C., filed May
31, 1938), quoted in Rostow & Cutler, supra note 280, at 1375.
292. See Blum & Kaplan, Absolute Priority, supra note 39, at 653; See also 2
DEWING, supra note 43, at 1270-73, 1277-81, 1288-90, 1335, 1367.
293. See text accompanying notes 295-97 infra. 62
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poration represent judicial intervention under similar circumstances
made after, however, rather than before, the issuance of the debt.294 For
example, in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric Co., 95 commonly re-
ferred to as the Deep Rock case, a parent corporation had totally domi-
nated its subsidiary, and had become its creditor in an enormous sum.
The record was replete with instances of mismanagement and waste, all
at the order of the parent company, most of them being to the benefit of
the parent and to the detriment of the subsidiary. The Supreme Court
approved the district court's subordination of the parent's creditor
claims to the claims of the noncontrolling preferred shareholders. 9
Unlike the Chapter X situation, the judicial intervention occurred after,
rather than before, the issuance of the debt obligation. Yet the inter-
vention was a response to conditions similar to those found in Chapter
X reorganizations; there was no brake on the amount or terms of the
debt the parent could cause the subsidiary to issue, nor was there any
market response to the increase in the extent of the subsidiary's reliance
upon -debt. The parent could denominate its interest in the subsidiary
as debt or equity at will, and the facts of the case reveal a willingness
to do just that.297 The point is that there were no external restraints
of any kind upon the subsidiary's capital structure.
The analogy, of course, is not perfect. Feasibility, posing the
problem of the firm's capital structure before the debt is issued, focuses
on the protection of the economy as a whole from a predilection for
excessively risky debt financing. Protection, supervision, and mediation
are needed due to the negotiation dynamics of the reorganization
process. On the other hand, the Deep Rock doctrine2 98 focuses more
narrowly upon the prevention of a windfall by prohibiting a party from
taking pecuniary advantage of a corporation over which that party
had complete control, inconsistent with his or her equity, position and
deleterious to the other interests of the corporation.299
294. BRUDNEY & CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 4, at 328.
295. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
296. Id. at 324.
297. Id. at 315-20.
298. See generally Sprecher, The Conflict of Equities Under the Deep Rock
Doctrine, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 336 (1943).
299. But cf. Atlas Pipe. Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 446 (1941), where a group of oil
companies were to be given the entire equity interest in the reorganized debtor under
a plan which the SEC felt provided for an extremely excessive amount of debt. The
group also wanted to contribute needed cash and get back a fully secured, priority
creditor interest in return. The SEC objected to this feature, comparing it to the
Deep Rock case "involving as it does the operation of controlled corporations with
inadequate equity investment, and the practice by controlling interests of making such
investment as loans." Id. Compare this to the court's holdings in the Costello case,
discussed at text accompanying notes 301-05 infra.
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The thin capitalization cases300 also provide a useful analogy, of
which Costello v. Fazio"0' is perhaps the best example. As in the Deep
Rock area, Costello represents judicial evaluation of capitalization after,
rather than before, the issuance of the debt in question. However, the
particular facts of the case forced the court to deal with the propriety
of actions taken at the time of the formation of the capital structure.
Three partners of an existing partnership with $51,000 of capital
contributions decided to incorporate. At a time when the enterprise
was only " 'two jumps ahead of the wolf,' "302 the partners took back
$6,000 in stock and $45,000 in demand notes with no specified interest
rate. Upon review of the corporation's bankruptcy proceedings, the
Ninth Circuit held that the notes had to be subordinated to the claims
of other creditors, despite the admitted absence of the kind of fraud
and mismanagement which characterized the Deep Rock case. 03 The
court emphasized that taking the debt obligations left the corporation
undercapitalized and the former partners should have known of "[t]he
likelihood that business failure would result from such undercapitaliza-
tion.13 0 4 Yet there was no showing that any interest or amortization
payments had ever been made on the loans that could have further
weakened the corporation's precarious financial structure. The impli-
cation seems clear; the court, focusing on the point in time when the
capital structure was formulated, implied that, at least in the face of
possible adversity, the essential capital contributions to an ongoing
business must be treated as a permanent investment in that corporation
and that the creation of debt, at least in this instance, does not so
qualify. 0 5 It should be noted that in Costello there were no market
restraints on the amounts of debt or equity the corporation could issue,
and therefore, the incorporators were not compelled to make a com-
parative market analysis of the yields demanded at various debt-equity
ratios; rather, they were able to make their own unfettered determina-
tion as to the form of their investment.
In the Chapter X situation, similar dynamics may be present. The
formation of a "new" corporation in the face of a real or perceived
risk of subsequent bankruptcy is the standard setting of reorganization
proceedings. The feasibility inquiry allows the reorganization court
300. The reference is to the thin capitalization cases within the context of cor-
poration law, and not tax law, in which the tax courts have recharacterized debt
as equity.
301. 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958).
302. Id. at 909, quoting Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307,
310 (1939).
303. 256 F.2d at 909. See In re Sterling House, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.
Va. 1973) ; In re Brunner Air Compressor Corp., 287 F. Supp. 256 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
304. 256 F.2d at 909.
305. Id. at 908-09. 64
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to intervene in order to prevent the undercapitalization that the Costello
court characterized as "inequitable conduct . . .not in acting to the
detriment of creditors then known, but in acting to the detriment of
present or future creditors, whoever they may be."' 06 Significantly, the
Chapter X context broadens the scope of this judicial protection; the
interests of creditors, workers and even the economy as a whole may be
injured if undercapitalization causes a reorganized debtor to suffer a
subsequent bankruptcy, or deceives investors into miscalculating the
value of a security, or causes any other detrimental effects to investors
and the securities markets generally. The greater interests at stake
perhaps justify the earlier and more heavy-handed intervention. Note
that the Costello court wasn't concerned with whether or not the sub-
stitution of demand notes for stock increased the inherent risks of
the corporation's financial failure. At least in the hands of the major
stockholders, the notes did not add any fixed charges to the corporation's
expenses, but merely operated to reorder priorities upon failure and
subsequent liquidation.
It has often been stated that the purpose of the feasibility in-
quiry (and, perhaps the entire scheme of Chapter X) is to maintain
the going concern value of the enterprise..3 " The act of filing for
reorganization represents a determination that judicial intervention
is necessary to insure that the corporation remains intact as a func-
tioning entity which has more social value than it would have upon
its liquidation.30 8 Further, some commentators have suggested that
in Chapter X reorganizations any difference between the going con-
cern value and the liquidation value must go to the creditors (as-
suming, of course, that the corporation is insolvent), as mandated
by the absolute priority -ule. 09 Professor Blum, however, disagrees
306. Id. at 911.
307. See 2 DEWING, supra note 43, at 282-84; PROTECTIVE COMM. REPORT, supra
note 6, pt. VIII, at 2-3; Gerdes, supra note 12, at 41-45.
308. As one commentator has noted:
In the social reality of today, however, shareholders are but one of several groups
of people who stand in a special relationship to the corporation. The corporation
is permanent, the shareholder is transitory. It might even be said without much
exaggeration that the corporation is really socially and politically a priori
whereas the shareholder's position is derivative and exists only in contemplation
of law. This, for instance, is the position taken in our bankruptcy laws which
put the maintenance of corporate integrity above the rights of the shareholders.
We would not have needed the experience of the Great Depression of 1929-1930
to show us that society must insist on the maintenance of the "going concern"
and must if necessary sacrifice to it the individual rights of shareholders, creditors,
workers, and, in the last analysis, even of consumers.
DRUCKER, supra note 24, at 20-21.
309. See, e.g., Trost, Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: For the Benefit of
Creditors or Stockholders?, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 540, 550 (1973). But cf. Blum &
Kaplan, Absolute Priority, supra note 39, at 660.
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and states that, "the basic objective of reorganization [is to insure
that] [j]unior interests receive something of value, out of the extra
value, which would have been denied them under a market place
regime. '"31x However, these interests only receive part of this "extra
value," since it is allocated among the parties by a plan that must be
fair and feasible. Fairness alone cannot dictate the allocation because
an infinite variety of qualitative and quantitative participation is pos-
sible - some of these possible participations (at least theoretically)
even changing the absolute amount of "extra value" to be distributed.
Feasibility must be considered because some of these formulas are un-
acceptable, and in -this way fairness and feasibility constantly intersect.
If the feasibility of a plan is judged on one level only - the less risk
the more feasible the plan is - then feasibility is solely a brake on the
allocation that the junior interests will try to command for themselves.
It is submitted that the SEC has adopted to some extent this unidimen-
sional approach to feasibility The sole exception is the F. L. Jacobs Co.
reorganization,81' in which the proposed plan was feasible to such an
extent that the Commission viewed as unfair a provision that would
limit dividends on the common stock until a substantial amount of the
debt of the reorganized debtor was retired. Professor Blum takes a
slightly different approach from the SEC, viewing feasibility in a much
broader fashion as encompassing plans which are less than optimally
feasible, as this is defined by the SEC. He notes that the fairness inquiry
is often narrowed (possibly through SEC intervention in the valuation
process), and the feasibility inquiry becomes the active center of con-
troversy between participating classes. In this vein, Blum points out:
A two-directional relationship between fairness and feasibility is
brought into focus. As a plan is thought to exceed the limits of
feasibility it tends to seem unfair to seniors. As a plan is thought
to fall short of the limits of feasibility it tends to seem unfair tojuniors. In this sense it might be said that in reorganization doc-
trine fairness and feasibility are merely two different impressions
of the same panorama.812
The problem with this approach is that it is predicated upon the view
that "the reorganization process was designed to preserve for iuniors
the greatest possible amount of value consistent with both full compen-
sation for seniors and adequate protection of the public interest as re-
310. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 596.
311. 42 S.E.C. 979 (1966). See note 187 supra for a brief discussion of this
reorganization.
312. Blum, The Law, supra note 4, at 587. 66
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flected in the canons of feasibility. ' 13" Thus, Blum sees the goal of
reorganization as maximizing the value of the junior interests and not
those of the seniors. One difficulty which arises here is that the legis-
lative history of Chapter X avoids any discussion of the social and
economic policy issues of who was intended to be the prime beneficiary
of a corporate reorganization. 14 Using a technique known well to the
legal profession, the drafters of Chapter X took a substantive issue of
political and economic significance and rendered a procedural solution;
the advances of Chapter X over equity receivership were more pro-
cedural than substantive. The Supreme Court, at the time when the
Chandler Act was adopted, had already accepted the burden of designat-
ing who was to benefit, and to what extent. Contrary to Professor
Blum's commentary, the drafters were addressing themselves to the
success of a reorganization, and not the priority schemes when they
specified that a plan be feasible. 15
V. CONCLUSIONS
Articles analyzing the principal aims and features of Chapter X
are legion, and it is not intended that this article be added to that list.
Yet this much is apparent; Chapter X was designed to change the
reorganization process as it had developed under equity receivership
and section 77B. Its purpose was to modernize the reorganization
procedure" 1' and change it from a privately contested "battle of wits,
313. Id. at 586. The question arises whether the junior interests were not better
off under the old equity receivership cases rather than under Chapter X. Professor
Altman has attempted a quantitative analysis of the changes which bankruptcy causes
to the financial position of prebankruptcy shareholders. E. ALTMAN, CORPORATE
BANKRUPTCY IN AMERICA 125-47 (1971).
314. See generally 1 COLLIER, supra note 4, 11 0.07. For general reference to
articles on this point, see id., jJ 0.07, at 17 n.1.
315. It should be noted that part of the confusion with respect to the question of
which class of persons Chapter X was intended to benefit, originates in the factual
backdrop of its enactment in 1938. At that time, it was the senior debt that had wide-
spread public holding, not the equity interests. Today, the typical pattern finds insti-
tutional investors holding a vast amount of senior debt, while the general public
maintains subordinated or equity interests in corporations. See Blum & Kaplan,
Absolute Priority, supra note 39, at 661. Accordingly, the SEC has been criticized
for actually harming the public investor and the public creditor by rigidly enforcing
the absolute priority rule and "cutting out" the public. See, e.g., Trost, supra note
309, at 544-45.
316. The following are the general purposes of the Chandler Act as found in the
Act's legislative history:
1. To clarify certain of the definitions and to add desirable new definitions;
to straighten out the statement of the acts of bankruptcy in order to avoid the
present overlapping of the third and fourth acts; and to enlarge the fifth act the
better to cover and curb equity receiverships.
2. To increase efficiency in administration.
3. To make clearer the provisions relative to the jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy courts.
4. To improve the procedural sections of the act.
[VOL. 20:"p. 302
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strategy and endurance into a study and solution of a problem in finan-
cial rehabilitation with conscious attention to the business principles
and the public interests involved." '317 Improved procedures and the
SEC's disinterested expertise were intended to move the reorganization
process steadily forward in each case. In reality, Chapter X was meant
to be a simplification of a complex procedure that had evolved to the
point of being unworkable. 18  Feasibility must be interpreted in this
context.
The various theories and analyses of the concept of feasibility
undoubtedly are accurate to a certain degree. Yet, as overall guide-
lines for the SEC and the courts, they all appear to miss the mark, at
least in comparison to the deceptively simple concept that introduced
this article - risk of ruin. Feasibility is, above all, a requirement that
the emerging corporation be a healthy one. It is not necessary that
the proposed plan guarantee fabulous financial success, or, for that
matter, even contemplate the reorganized debtor existing beyond the
economic lifespan of its major assets. All that is required is that the
plan show a means by which the reorganized debtor will avoid a
re-reorganization or bankruptcy. This is the meaning of feasibility -
the reorganized debtor must be capable of emerging as a viable cor-
porate entity and not as a permanent cripple of the business world.
The actual controversies over feasibility, be they reflected in the
SEC advisory reports or the judicial reporters, have strayed from
this simple standard for the feasibility inquiry. The SEC in particular
has used the concept of feasibility to serve a host of purposes in one
case, only to face the problem of rationalizing its approach in the
next. No doubt the seeming morass of advisory reports could have
evolved into a unified statement of the feasibility concept, useful to the
5. To tighten up the provisions for the enforcement of the criminal provisions
of the law.
6. To minimize evasions by bankrupts and to grant certain new privileges
in favor of bankrupts.
7. To make more effective the discharge provisions of the act.
8. To perfect the sections relative to preferences, liens and fraudulent con-
veyances, and the title of the trustee.
9. To provide a more workable partnership section.
10. To prescribe an improved composition procedure, including certain of the
so-called "relief provisions" of the act for individual compositions and extensions
and a carefully prepared plan for corporate reorganizations, retaining the desir-
able permanent provisions of the new legislation and eliminating cumbersome,
overlapping, and inconsistent provisions; also providing for wage-earner amortiza-
tions and real-property arrangements by unincorporated persons; and
in general, to modernize and bring up to date the bankruptcy law of our country.
S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1938) ; H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1937).
317. Frank, supra note 41, at 351.
318. See the comments of Thurman Arnold, set out in the text accompanying
note 13 supra. 68
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drafters of proposal plans of reorganization, if the SEC had approached
each with a stable concept of risk of ruin, but it did not. For example,
feasibility may have started out as a measure of the risk of subsequent
failure, but the SEC quickly merged its role under Chapter X with
its role as the protector of the securities markets, and the concept of
"inherently deceptive and therefore not feasible" was created. From
here, the next step was predictable. Confusing its functions under
Chapter X with those as administrator of the federal securities laws,
the SEC became extremely sensitive to the possibility of deception in
the issuance of securities of a reorganized debtor. Yet the Commis-
sion is not blameworthy by itself for this result. Though Chapter X
may provide for an independent expert relating tried and tested finan-
cial principles to the reorganization court, the reality of the proceed-
ings dictates otherwise. The SEC operates in a bargaining atmosphere;
it bargains with the other parties before the court, and actively negoti-
ates for changes in the various plans with them. The Commission
does not advocate the "ideal" plan in any sense of the word; it merely
attempts to get the court to choose a plan with which it can be content.
Once the features of the plan, -or plans, to which the SEC has objected
have been culled, the SEC will maneuver to get before the court that
which it considers to be the best plan proposed.
The published advisory reports represent the select few of all the
reports which the SEC feels will best illustrate certain of those objec-
tionable features, and give future reorganization participants and the
bar a general idea of what exactly is desired. These published reports
undoubtedly represent the most coherent ones written - perhaps we
can say, the most coherent of the incoherent. This cross section of
feasibility problems surely needs and deserves a clearer definition than
its guardian, the SEC, 'has bestowed upon it. However, the Commis-
sion may not be willing to tip its hat, so to speak, and in this manner
feasibility retains sufficient flexibility of which the SEC makes power-
ful use.
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